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AND THE MATERIALITY OF PRELIMINARY
MERGER NEGOTIATIONS AFTER IN RE
GEORGE C. KERN, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commis-
sion") Rule 14d-9' requires that when the target of a tender
offer recommends that its shareholders either accept or reject
the offer, the target must file a Schedule 14D-92 with the SEC.
Schedule 14D-9 contains specific "line-item" provisions requir-
ing disclosure of information that the SEC deems important in
the context of a tender offer. For example, Item 7(a)(1) of
Schedule 14D-9 requires a target company to disclose negoti-
" Exchange Act Release No. 29,356, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) T 84,815 (June 21, 1991).
1 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9 (1993).
2 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (1993); see infra note 195. Rule 14d-9 and Schedule
14D-9 were promulgated under the authority granted to the SEC by Congress in §
14(d)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4)
(1988) ("Any solicitation or recommendation to the holders of. . . a security to
accept or reject a tender ... shall be made in accordance with such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe."). Section 14 is part of the Williams
Act (codified at sections 12, 13 and 14 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e)
and 78n(d)-(f) (1988)); which amended the 1934 Act and was enacted mainly to
provide shareholders with sufficient time and information with which to make
informed investment decisions. It did so by mandating disclosure in certain, statu-
torily enumerated contexts and by granting the SEC broad authority to promulgate
rules requiring additional disclosure. For a discussion of the Williams Act and the
various rules and disclosure schedules promulgated thereunder, see infra notes 73-
124 and accompanying text.
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ations3 undertaken in response to a tender offer that would
lead to certain significant corporate events such as a merger or
a reorganization,4 while Item 7(b) requires the target company
to disclose any board resolution adopted, or agreement in prin-
ciple reached, with respect to those significant events.5 Fur-
thermore, Rule 14d-9(b) requires that, "[i]f any material
change occurs in the information set forth in the Schedule
14D-9," the target company must disseminate that change to
shareholders and promptly file an amendment to its Schedule
14D-9 with the SEC.7
To date, most of the scholarly literature concerning a
corporation's duty to disclose preliminary merger negotiations
has focused on the antifraud provisions of section 10(b)8 and
Rule 10b-5' promulgated thereunder. ° By contrast, line-item
provisions such as Item 7 of Schedule 14D-9, which create an
affirmative duty to disclose preliminary merger negotiations,
have received surprisingly little attention. Indeed, very few
commentators and even fewer courts have discussed in any
detail the concept of materiality as it relates to a target
' For the meaning of the term "negotiations," see infra notes 221-34 and ac-
companying text.
" Id. (Item 7); see infra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
5 Id.
6 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9(b) (1993).
Id. (emphasis added).
8 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993). Under Rule 10b-5, a corporation must disclose
material negotiations when it trades in its own stock or to correct a previous,
voluntary statement that was misleading when issued, or to correct one that has
become misleading by virtue of subsequent corporate events. See Peter C. Pappas,
Comment, The Expanding Scope of Materiality and the Duty to Disclose: Basic, Inc.
v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988), Removes a Safe Harbor, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
295, 297-99 (1988).
'8 See C. D. Ewell, Rule 10b-5 and the Duty to Disclose Merger Negotiations in
Corporate Statements, 96 YALE L.J. 547 (1987); Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Disclo-
sure of Preliminary Merger Negotiations as an Imperfect Paradigm of Rule 10b-5
Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1218 (1987); Thomas L. Hazen, Rumor Control and
Disclosure of Merger Negotiations or other Control-Related Transactions Full Dis-
closure or 'No Comment"-the Only Safe Harbors, 46 MD. L. REV. 954 (1987);
Pappas, supra note 9; Robert H. Rosenblum, An Issuer's Duty Under Rule 10b-5 to
Correct and Update Materially Misleading Statements, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 289
(1991); Noreen R. Weiss, Note, Rule 10b-5 and the Corporation's Duty to Disclose
Merger Negotiations: A Proposal for the Safe Harbor from the Storm of Uncertain-
ty, 55 FoRDHAi L. REV. 731 (1987) (all discussing the duty to disclose material
preliminary merger negotiations under Rule 10b-5).
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company's affirmative duty of disclosure under such line-item
provisions.1 Specifically, whether or not Item 7(a)(1) of
Schedule 14D-9 requires disclosure of negotiations which, un-
der the traditional test of materiality,' might not be consid-
ered material, remains subject to debate.
3 But Item 7 ap-
pears to require disclosure of preliminary merger negotiations
irrespective of their materiality. 4 This raises an important
question because Rule 14d-9(b) requires disclosure of only
material changes in the information previously divulged.
Should a person responsible for deciding whether to amend the
target company's original Item 7(a) disclosure be permitted,
under Rule 14d-9(b), to assess independently the materiality of
the new information, despite the fact that Item 7(a)(1) itself
does not predicate disclosure on materiality? 5 In In re George
" See J. Robert Brown, Jr., Corporate Secrecy, the Federal Securities Laws, and
the Disclosure of Ongoing Negotiations, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 93, 106-07 (1986)
(discussing Schedule 14D-9, Item 7's disclosure requirements but declining to as-
sess whether Item 7 information is per se material); Daniel L. Goelzer, Disclosure
of Preliminary Merger Negotiations-Truth or Consequences?, 46 MD. L. REV. 974,
982 (1987) (duty to disclose under Item 7 is absolute and is not predicated on
materiality); Joseph I. Goldstein et al., Disclosure of a Potential Change in Corpo-
rate Control, 19 SEC. & CoMM. REG. 133, 142 (1986) (discussing Item 7 and sug-
gesting that the focus should be on compliance with the line-item provision and
not on the materiality of the information).
12 Whether preliminary merger negotiations are material for Rule 10b-5 pur-
poses involves a balancing of the probability that a merger will occur against the
magnitude of the event in light of the totality of company activity. Basic, Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988) (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d
833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) [hereinafter TGS]).
The Basic court also expressly adopted the materiality test it propounded in the
context of a proxy statement omission in TSC. Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426
U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (an omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likeli-
hood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding wheth-
er to vote). See infra notes 23-72 and accompanying text.
13 Goelzer, supra note 11, at 981-82 ("The obligation to disclose preliminary
merger negotiations pursuant to item 7(a) is absolute in the sense that no sepa-
rate duty to disclose is necessary .... Materiality is not an issue."); see Brown,
supra note 11, at 101 n.34 ("Whether the failure to disclose information specifically
required by a Commission rule is always material has not been resolved ....
While not all line item disclosure requirements would be necessarily material un-
der the standard set forth in TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,
449 (1976), an argument can be made that because investors have an expectation
of receiving the information, its omission would be material."); see also infra note
191.
14 Goelzer, supra note 11, at 982. In other words, those individuals charged
with making disclosures may not assess independently the materiality of the nego-
tiations; they must simply disclose them as the rules require.
15 Id. It would seem incongruous that Rule 14d-9(b) requires the disclosure of
1993]
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C. Kern, Jr.,16 the SEC recently chose to forego a unique op-
portunity to address this issue.
In Kern an SEC Administrative Law Judge ("AI") con-
cluded that a prominent Sullivan & Cromwell partner, George
Kern, had caused17 Allied Stores Corp. ("Allied") to violate
Rules 14d-9 and 14d-9(b) by failing to disclose promptly certain
negotiations that had taken place in connection with Allied's
attempt to stave off a hostile bid by Campeau Corp.
("Campeau")."5 Mr. Kern, who was outside counsel to and a
board member of Allied, had been delegated the sole responsi-
bility of making required SEC disclosures. Applying the mate-
riality test adopted in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 9 the ALJ con-
cluded that the negotiations at issue were material and, thus,
constituted a "material change in the information" requiring
disclosure." But the SEC's Division of Enforcement ("Divi-
sion"), which prosecuted the charges against Mr. Kern, had
attempted to argue that in promulgating Schedule 14D-9, the
SEC had already concluded that negotiations occurring in
response to a tender offer are per se material. Implicit in the
Division's argument, therefore, is the conclusion that Basic's
materiality test was inapplicable to the negotiations under
scrutiny in Kern." This fundamental difference in philosophy
only material information whereas Item 7 requires disclosure of negotiations with-
out regard to the materiality of the information. See infra notes 235-48 and ac-
companying text.
16 Exchange Act Release No. 29,356, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 9 84,815 (June 21, 1991).
17 Under § 15(c)(4) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(4) (1988 & Supp. II
1991), the SEC may publish its findings and issue an order requiring "any person
who was a cause of the failure to comply due to an act or omission the person
knew or should have known would contribute to the failure to comply, to comply,
or to take steps to effect compliance," with sections 12, 13 or 14 of the 1934 Act
(emphasis added).
18 In re George C. Kern, Jr., Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-6869, [1988-
89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,342 (Nov. 14, 1988) [hereinafter
Initial Decision].
19 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
2" Initial Decision, supra note 18, at 89,583, 89,585, 89,587-88. Applying the
same test, Mr. Kern argued that the probability of the negotiations leading to a
significant corporate event was too low to be disclosed and that their disclosure
would have misled the market. Thus, he contended, the negotiations were not
material. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
21 The Division took this position in its Pre-trial Brief (Pre-trial Brief of the
Division of Enforcement at 1, on file with the author); at the beginning of the
hearing, Hearing Transcript 33-34; in its Post-hearing Memorandum (Post-Hearing
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was one of the central issues in the Kern case.
The full Commission, however, after deciding sua sponte to
review the Al's decision, failed to rule on the merits, conclud-
ing only that the Division had no authority to seek orders
requiring (general) future compliance with tender offer rules
under section 15(c)(4) of the 1934 Act.2 As a result, the Com-
mission missed an important opportunity to resolve an appar-
ent conflict between the disclosure requirements under Rule
14d-9 and the amendment requirements under Rule 14d-9(b).
This Comment argues that, in determining that the negoti-
ations at issue in Kern constituted a "material change in the
information," the ALJ's analysis of those negotiations under
Basic's materiality standard was incorrect for three reasons.
First, preliminary merger negotiations occurring during the
pendency of a tender offer, which are specifically required to be
disclosed under line-item provisions such as Item 7(a)(1) of
Schedule 14D-9, are always "material" under generally accept-
ed tests of materiality. Thus, the onset of any negotiation spe-
cifically required to be disclosed under Item 7(a)(1) is per se
material and, by logic, constitutes a material change in the
information as a matter of law for Rule 14d-9(b) purposes.
Second, the SEC's rules explicitly state that the Northway
standard is to be applied to the word "material" when it is
used to qualify the furnishing of information. Thus, the AUJ
similarly erred in applying Basic to the negotiations at issue in
Kern. Finally, and as a matter of common sense, because Item
7(a)(1) does not predicate disclosure on materiality, no person
should be permitted to inject a materiality threshold by subjec-
tively withholding what he or she believes to be immaterial
information simply because the words "material change" ap-
pear in the amendment rule. Simply put, the occurrence of
even a non-material event which is specifically required to be
disclosed under a line-item provision, but which occurs after
Brief of the Division of Enforcement at 23-24, on file with the author); and in its
Memorandum of Law before the full Commission (Memorandum of Law of the
Division of Enforcement at 26, on file with the author) [hereinafter numbers pre-
ceded by "HT' refer to the transcript of the administrative hearing held on Janu-
ary 19, 1988, et seq.]. As for why the Division's argument did not prevail, see
infra note 242.
' In re George C. Kern, Jr., Exchange Act Release No. 29,356, [1991 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 84,815, at 82,005 (June 21, 1991).
19931
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the initial schedule has been filed, also must constitute a per
se material change in the information requiring disclosure.
Part I of this Comment briefly surveys the development of
the materiality standard as it pertains to preliminary merger
negotiations, and provides a brief overview of the Williams Act
and its underlying rationale. Part II then reviews the facts of
the Kern case, the AI's Initial Decision, and the Opinion of
the Commission. Finally, Part III proposes a general frame-
work for analyzing the materiality of information specifically
required to be disclosed under the SEC's line-item provisions
and provides several examples of line-item provisions (includ-
ing Schedule 14D-9, Item 7) that call for the disclosure of infor-
mation that is material per se. To avoid the sort of disagree-
ment that arose in the Kern case, Part III suggests that the
SEC clarify Rule 14d-9(b)-and all such similar amendment
provisions-so that the "material change in the information"
language would not leave filing entities free to assess, under
either Basic or Northway, the materiality of information that is
either material as a matter of law or specifically required to be
disclosed irrespective of its materiality.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Materiality Standard Applicable to Preliminary
Merger Negotiations
Although the concept of materiality in securities law has
in some cases been elusive,' the analysis of what constitutes
' Indeed, the difficulty in defining materiality is comparable to attempts to
define the concept of proximate cause in negligence law suits. In one case, Nobles
v. First Carolina Communications, Inc., 929 F.2d 141 (4th Cir. 1991), the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a suit by Nobles, an investor, who had bought
limited partnership units under a Partnership Agreement that gave the investor
no right to object to the dissolution of the Partnership. When the general partners
agreed to dissolve the Partnership two years later, the investor sued the general
partners claiming that their proxy solicitations contained several material misrep-
resentations and omissions. Specifically, Nobles claimed that the Schedule 13E-3
filed in connection with the dissolution of the partnership failed to comply with
the general instructions for completing the Schedule. The court held that even if
the allegations of omissions were true, those omissions were immaterial as a mat-
ter of law because Nobles had no choice to sell his limited partnership interest.
Id. at 145. Clearly, the Fourth Circuit confused materiality with causation. Wheth-
er or not Nobles had any power to affect the transaction has no bearing on
[Vol. 59:175
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material information is not inherently complicated. In Basic,
Inc. v. Levinson,24 the Supreme Court adopted a test for as-
sessing the materiality of preliminary merger negotiations,
drawing on two landmark securities law cases-TSC Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.' and SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
("TGS").2" Northway established a straightforward materiality
test for the disclosure of information under the rule prohibiting
material misstatements and omissions in proxy statements,
27
and that standard has applied with equal force to the disclo-
sure requirements of the SEC's tender offer rules. TGS es-
tablished a balancing test for evaluating the materiality of
contingent information in the context of a Rule 10b-5 antifraud
suit. The Basic standard reveals that informed investor
decisionmaking is central to the Court's reasoning.
whether the information in the Schedule 13E-3 was material-or important-to
him. If the general partners had disclosed information truthfully, Nobles might
have had sufficient information with which to pursue a state law claim for breach
of fiduciary duty. See, e.g., Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 972 F.2d 700 (6th
Cir. 1992) (holding that in a freeze-out merger, material omissions by the majority
shareholders that force the minority shareholders to forego their state law reme-
dies are sufficient to establish causation even though the minority shareholders
did not have enough votes to block the merger), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1645
(1993).
2' 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
426 U.S. 438 (1976).
2 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
' Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1993).
3 THOMAS L. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 11.4, at 487 (2d
ed. 1990) ("The materiality requirement has necessarily carried over to the
antifraud provisions of the securities laws and, of course, is also found in the
affirmative disclosure requirements of ... the 1934 Exchange Act.") (footnote omit-
ted).
' The finance theory underlying in the disclosure requirements and the materi-
ality standard is not inherently difficult. The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis
("ECMIF) posits that share prices fully and accurately reflect all available infor-
mation. Christopher P. Saari, Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Eco-
nomic Theory and the Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1031
(1977). "The mechanism of price formation somehow captures information about
and predicts the future payout of a security (dividends, interest, and capital gain
or loss)." Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly In-
formation, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 770-71 (1985). Thus,
implicit in the ECMH is the proposition that all relevant information will be avail-
able to the market, which will instantaneously digest and reflect that information.
Id. at 771. Since all relevant information concerning a company will be available
to the public, share prices will quickly react to any abnormal trading activity,
thereby denying abnormal returns to all investors. See Saari, supra, at 1046.
Therefore, according to prevailing finance theory, any definition of materiality must
1993]
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1. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.
In TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,3" a minority
shareholder of TSC Industries sued TSC and National Indus-
tries, Inc. for alleged material omissions in a joint proxy state-
ment issued by the companies that recommended acceptance of
National's proposed buy-out of TSC 1 Northway claimed that
the companies had violated Rule 14a-332 by omitting required
information from their Schedule 14A.33 Northway sued the
companies under section 14(a) of the 1934 Act 4 and Rule 14a-
935 promulgated thereunder." The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's denial of
Northway's motion for summary judgment on the Rule 14a-9
claim, holding that certain omissions were material as a mat-
ter of law.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that whether or not
a fact is material is a mixed question of law and fact. The
Court also cautioned against resolving the issue of materiality
on a motion for summary judgment.38 The Court defined a
start with the premise that share prices will accurately reflect all public informa-
tion "of obvious interest" to the market. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman,
The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 55-56 (1984). See gener-
ally James Harlan Koenig, Comment, The Basics of Disclosure: The Market for
Information in the Market for Corporate Control, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1021, 1051-
52 (1989).
30 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
31 Id. at 441.
32 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1993). Rule 14a-3 prohibits the solicitation of proxies
without providing to solicited shareholders a proxy statement containing the infor-
mation specified in Schedule 14A_ 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1993).
' Northway, 426 U.S. at 441. Specifically, Northway claimed that the compa-
nies had failed to include information required by Item 5(e) of Schedule 14A,
which requires the issuer to disclose whether or not a change in control of the
issuer had occurred since the beginning of the fiscal year, the name of the per-
son(s) acquiring control, and the transaction which resulted in the change in con-
trol. Northway, 426 U.S. at 442.
' 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988). Section 14(a) prohibits the solicitation of proxies
"in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe."
Id.
5 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1993). Rule 14a-9 is nearly identical to Rule 10b-5.
See supra note 8. It forbids the solicitation of any proxy by means of a proxy
statement containing a statement that "is false and misleading with respect to any
material fact, or which omits to state any material fact." Id.
Northway, 426 U.S. at 441-42.
37 Id. at 443.
' Id. at 450. The Court explained that:
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standard that represented a compromise between other courts'
definitions of materiality (including the Seventh Circuit's for-
mulation in Northway), which set too low a threshold for mate-
riality, and its recognition that Rule 14a-9 was intended to
provide shareholders with sufficient information with which to
make an informed decision. That standard, which is now wide-
ly quoted by courts in securities disputes, provides:
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how
to vote .... It does not require proof of a substantial likelihood that
disclosure of the omitted fact would have caused the reasonable
shareholder to change his vote. What the standard does contemplate
is a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all the circum-
stances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in
the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder."
The Court continued, "[p]ut another way, there must be a
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made avail-
able. 4°
This standard is not intrinsically difficult to apply. By
using a "reasonable shareholder" standard, it provides an ob-
jective test for assessing the significance of information and
whether the information would have been important to a
shareholder in light of all available information.
41 The
Northway Court concluded that none of the omissions alleged
by Northway were so significant as to warrant an entry of
The issue of materiality may be characterized as a mixed question of law
and fact, involving as it does the application of a legal standard to a
particular set of facts. Only if the established omissions are "so obviously
important to an investor, that reasonable minds cannot differ on the
question of materiality" is the ultimate issue of materiality appropriately
resolved "as a matter of law" by summary judgment.
Id. (citations omitted).
" Id. at 449 (emphasis added). The court rejected the Seventh Circuit's formula
for materiality which held that an omitted fact is material if shareholders might
consider it important as setting too low a materiality threshold: "some information
is of such dubious significance that insistence on its disclosure may accomplish
more harm than good." Id. at 448.
40 Id. at 449.
", The SEC essentially codified Northway's materiality standard in Rule 12b-2,
17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (1993), which defines terms used in forms and statements
required to be filed pursuant to the 1934 Act. For the full text of Rule 12b-2, see
infra note 201-02 and accompanying text.
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summary judgment in his favor.42
2. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur,43  which 'predated
Northway by eight years, the Second Circuit established a two-
part balancing test for assessing the materiality of events that
might affect the probable future of a company. The SEC sought
injunctive relief against several corporate insiders for trading
on certain nonpublic information in violation of section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.45 The information
in question was the discovery by TGS, after exploratory
drilling, of a potentially major ore reserve.46 During further
exploratory drilling, and before issuing a press release to re-
veal its discovery, several TGS insiders purchased shares in
the company and "tipped off' several people as to the discov-
ery.' The district court found that two corporate insiders had
violated Rule 10b-5."
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. In
so doing, the court established the "probability/magnitude" test
for the materiality of information that might affect the proba-
42 Northway, 426 U.S. at 463-64. Clearly, if a line-item provision calls for the
disclosure of information that would always be material (under Northway), then
that information is material as a matter of law. Indeed, the Northway court hint-
ed that a complete failure to include in the proxy statement information indicative
of a change in control-information specifically required under Schedule 14A, Item
5(e)-would have constituted a per se violation of Rule 14a-9:
We emphasize that we do not intend to imply that facts suggestive of
control need be disclosed only if in fact there was control. If, for exam-
ple, the proxy statement in this case had failed to reveal National's 34%
stock interest in TSC and the presence of five National nominees on
TSC's board, these omissions would have rendered the statement mate-
rially misleading as a matter of law, regardless of whether National can
be said with certainty to have been in "control" of TSC.
Id. at 453 n.15. Implicit in the court's reasoning is the conclusion that Item 5(e)
calls for the disclosure of information that is per se material because materiality is
a crucial element of a Rule 14a-9 violation. The implications of the Court's dicta
for the Kern case are immense. See infra notes 191-209 and accompanying text.
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)
[hereinafter TGS].
" See supra notes 10-11.
45 TGS, 401 F.2d at 833.
46 Id. at 843-44.
47 Id.
' SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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ble future of the company: "In each case, then, whether facts
are material within Rule 10b-5... will depend at any given
time upon a balancing of both the indicated probability that
the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the
event in light of the totality of the company activity."49 The
court went on to conclude that knowledge of the discovery
would have been important to a reasonable investor "and
might have affected the price of the stock."5" Northway nei-
ther accepted nor rejected TGS, and most lower courts have
relied on the Northway definition of materiality in connection
with suits arising under the Williams Act.5
3. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson
The materiality of preliminary merger negotiations or
similar "inchoate" plans has caused widespread debate and
presents a more difficult analysis.52 This is due in large part
to competing policy objectives.53 On the one hand, a philoso-
phy of full disclosure permeates the securities laws and, thus,
militates in favor of earlier disclosure.' On the other hand,
premature disclosure of preliminary negotiations may tend to
mislead the market and jeopardize potential deals.55 Accord-
49 TGS, 401 F.2d at 849.
" Id. at 850 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Interestingly, the court used
the "might affect" test for materiality later specifically rejected in Northway. See
supra note 39 and accompanying text.
"1 See HAZEN, supra note 28, § 11.4, at 487.
52 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 11, at 117; Pappas, supra note 9, at 296-97. See
generally HAZEN, supra note 28, § 11.4, at 490.
' Douglas M. Branson, SEC Nonacquiescence in Judicial Decisionmaking: Tar-
get Company Disclosure of Acquisition Negotiations, 46 MD. L. REV. 1001, 1015-18
(1987); Brown, supra note 11, at 93-96; See also John R. Gailey III, Comment, A
Critical Survey of Target Company Disclosure Obligations Under the Williams Act,
59 TEMP. L.Q. 1189, 1189 (1986); Goelzer, supra note 11, at 985-86; Hazen, supra
note 10, at 961; James J. Moylan, Exploring the Tender Offer Provisions of the
Federal Securities Laws, 43 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 551, 564-66 (1975); Marc I.
Steinberg & Robin M. Goldman, Issuer Affirmative Disclosure Obligations: An Ana-
lytical Framework for Merger Negotiations, Soft Information, and Bad News, 46
MD. L. REV. 923, 925-26 (1987); H. Frasier Ives, Note, Disclosing the White
Knight-When Does the Duty Arise?, 42 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 1045, 1048 (1985);
Pappas, supra note 9, at 296, 307-312 (all acknowledging that the materiality of
preliminary merger negotiations puts the benefits of informed decisionmaking
squarely in conflict with the drawbacks of premature disclosure).
' See infra notes 73-125 and accompanying text.
r Commentators have noted that during a tender offer a target company's
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ingly, under the Northway standard, while some negotiations
may alter the "total mix" of information available to sharehold-
ers, whether or not those negotiations would be considered
important in deciding to buy or sell a particular security has
been the subject of considerable debate.5" As a result, prior to
Basic some courts held that preliminary negotiations were
immaterial as a matter of law until parties had reached an
agreement in principle.57 In other words, those courts deter-
share price becomes extremely volatile, reacting to even the slightest piece of in-
formation. Hazen, supra note 10, at 956. Thus, they conclude, premature disclosure
of negotiations may lead investors to believe that a deal is imminent, causing
them to purchase the target company's shares. This, in turn, pushes the price of
the shares up and may make the putative deal prohibitively expensive for the
potential acquiror. Id.; Brown, supra note 11, at 145; Koenig, supra note 29, at
1023. Furthermore, many potential acquirors insist on negotiating in secrecy; pre-
mature disclosure therefore could potentially interfere with the progress of acquisi-
tion negotiations. Goelzer, supra note 11, at 992; Hazen, supra note 10, at 954;
Steinberg & Goldman, supra note 53, at 926-27.
6 See Goelzer, supra note 11, at 992; HAZEN, supra note 28, § 11.4, at 490-91.
57 Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 484 U.S. 853
(1987); Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1215 (1985); Reiss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 711 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1983);
Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196 (3d Cir. 1982). In Staffin, the Third Circuit
held that preliminary negotiations were immaterial as a matter of law until the
parties had reached an agreement in principle because "disclosure of them may
itself be misleading .... Those persons who would buy stock on the basis of the
occurrence of preliminary merger discussions preceding a merger which never oc-
curs, are left 'holding the bag' .... " Id. at 1206-07. Citing Staffin, the Second
Circuit, in Reiss, held that:
It does not serve the underlying purposes of the securities acts to compel
disclosure of merger negotiations in the not unusual circumstances before
us .... Such negotiations are inherently fluid and the eventual outcome
is shrouded in uncertainty. Disclosure may in fact be more misleading
than secrecy so far as investment decisions are concerned.
Reiss, 711 F.2d at 14 (citations omitted). In Greenfield, the Third Circuit extended
its Staffin ruling to affirmative misstatements by a company such that, pursuant
to an inquiry from a stock exchange, it could deny the existence of preliminary
negotiations, even though negotiations were actually underway. Greenfield, 742
F.2d at 754-57. The Commission, in In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release
No. 22,214, [1984-85 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,801 (July 8,
1985), announced its belief that Greenfield had been wrongly decided, cautioned
issuers that some preliminary negotiations may become material prior to an agree-
ment-in-principle, and warned that it would institute enforcement proceedings
against any company that affirmatively denied the existence of material negotia-
tions when such negotiations were in fact underway. Id. at 87,596 n.8. In Flamm,
the Seventh Circuit held that the preliminary negotiations were immaterial as a
matter of law until the parties had reached an agreement on price and structure.
The court concluded that premature disclosure could hinder negotiations, perceiving
what it believed was a need for a bright-line rule to guide disclosure obligations.
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mined that until parties had reached an agreement on the
price and structure of a deal, no reasonable shareholder who
wished to purchase or sell shares in a corporation would con-
sider it important that the corporation was negotiating for a
merger or disposition of its assets.
Thus, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court, in Ba-
sic, Inc. v. Levinson," rejected the agreement-in-principle,
bright-line standard. Basic involved a Rule 10b-5 "duty not to
mislead" case brought by a class of shareholders who claimed
that three separate statements by Basic during 1977-78 were
materially misleading and caused them to sell their shares in
Basic at an artificially depressed price. 9 Specifically, with re-
gard to two inquiries into unusual trading activity in its
shares, Basic publicly stated that no negotiations were under-
way and that it knew of no reasons for the unusual activity."
However, since September 1976 Basic had been negotiating
with Combustion Engineering, Inc. for a possible merger.6' On
December 18, 1978, Basic announced that it had been ap-
proached concerning a merger and, two days later, its board of
directors accepted Combustion's forty-six dollars per share
offer.62 On the issue of materiality, the district court ruled
that any misstatements were immaterial as a matter of law.'
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding
that under TGS, Basic's statements were misleading and that
even if the negotiations normally would not be material, they
became so by the company's very denial of their existence. The
Sixth Circuit explicitly rejected the bright-line, agreement-in-
principle standard.'
Flamm, 814 F.2d at 1174-75.
The Supreme Court, in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 479 U.S. 1083 (1987), granted
certiorari to resolve the split in the various courts of appeal as to the correct
standard of materiality to be applied to preliminary merger negotiations.
485 U.S. 224 (1988).
Basic, 485 U.S. 224 at 227-29.
60 Id. at 227-28.
6' Id.
6Id.
Levinson v. Basic, Inc., [1984-85 Transfer Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
91,801 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 3, 1984). The district court adopted a presumption, pre-
mised upon the fraud on the market theory, that the plaintiffs had relied on the
alleged misstatements and certified their class. Id. The fraud-on-the-market theory
is a corollary of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, see supra note 29; an
efficient market inaccurately reflects all material omissions or misstatements.
" Levinson v. Basic, 786 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1986). The Sixth Circuit affirmed
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The Supreme Court reversed. Although it agreed with the
Sixth Circuit in unanimously rejecting the bright-line, agree-
ment-in-principle test for materiality, 5 the Court rejected the
notion that a corporation's denial of a fact it knows to be true
renders the fact material. Instead, the Court adopted a fact-
specific, case-by-case test for materiality that drew from both
its prior Northway decision and the Second Circuit's TGS prob-
ability/magnitude test."s The Court reviewed the policies un-
derlying its Northway decision, noting that the application of
the Northway test to preliminary merger negotiations was not
"self-evident."67 The Court firmly rejected, however, the three
rationales offered in support of the agreement-in-principle
standard, stating that "none of these policy-based ratio-
nales... purports to explain why drawing the line at agree-
ment-in-principle reflects the significance of the information
upon the investor's decision.""
The Court held, therefore, that whether or not preliminary
negotiations were material is a fact-specific inquiry, and adopt-
ed the TGS probability/magnitude test for materiality." Per-
the lower court's class certification relying on the presumption of reliance.
' Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
66 Id. at 230-39.
' Id. at 232 ("Where . ..the event is contingent or speculative in nature, it is
difficult to ascertain whether the 'reasonable investor' would have considered the
omitted information significant at the time. Merger negotiations, because of the
ever-present possibility that the contemplated transaction will not be effectuated,
fall into [that] category.").
' Id. at 234. This acknowledgement was crucial, for it explained precisely why
a bright-line rule limiting materiality to agreements-in-principle is completely un-
workable: it substitutes a court's personal belief as to what information is impor-
tant for that of the reasonable shareholder. In effect, it shifts Northway's test from
an objective standard to a subjective one.
More significantly, the Basic Court cited to the Seventh Circuit's opinion in
Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169 '(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 853 (1987), in
which the court rejected as weak the justification that premature disclosure may
confuse investors: "It assumes that investors are nitwits, unable to appreci-
ate-even when told-that mergers are risky propositions up until the closing.'
Disclosure, not paternalistic withholding of accurate information, is the policy cho-
sen and expressed by Congress." Basic, 485 U.S. at 234 (quoting Flamm, 814 F.2d
at 1175).
6 Basic, 485 U.S. at 239. The Court suggested ways of evaluating the proba-
bility and magnitude of future events:
[I]n order to assess the probability that the event will occur, a factfinder
will need to look to indicia of interest in the transaction at the highest
corporate levels. Without attempting to catalog all such factors, we note
by way of example that board resolutions, instructions to investment
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haps most significantly, the Court quoted a passage from the
Second Circuit's decision in SEC v. Geon Industries, Inc.:70
Since a merger in which it is bought out is the most important event
that can occur in a small corporation's life, to wit, its death, we
think that inside information, as regards a merger of this sort, can
become material at an earlier stage than would be the case as re-
gards lesser transactions-and this even though the mortality rate
of mergers in such formative stages is doubtless high.7'
In sum, the Basic Court explicitly rejected the bright-line,
agreement-in-principle test for materiality of preliminary
merger negotiations, opting instead for a more fact-specific,
case-by-case analysis. Implicit in the Court's holding in Basic
is the inescapable conclusion that preliminary merger negotia-
tions can become material well before the parties reach any
agreement on price and structure.72
B. The Williams Act
The Williams Act's73 overriding purpose is to provide
shareholders sufficient time and information with which to
make informed investment decisions. The Williams Act
achieves this goal in one of two ways: it either mandates that
certain, statutorily enumerated information be disclosed (along
with any additional information as the SEC may require), or it
simply grants to the SEC broad authority to pass rules requir-
ing disclosure of specific information in certain contexts.
bankers, and actual negotiations between principals or their intermediar-
ies may serve as indicia of interest. To assess the magnitude of the
transaction to the issuer . . . a factfinder will need to consider such facts
as the size of the two corporate entities and of the potential premiums
over market value.
Id.
70 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976).
7 Basic, 485 U.S. at 238 (quoting Geon, 531 F.2d at 47-48).
72 Some have expressed displeasure with the uncertainty that the new standard
could cause. See Pappas, supra note 9, at 311-12 (criticizing Basic for failing to
provide corporate managers with a bright-line rule to guide them, and for failing
to abate burgeoning insider trading).




The Williams Act, passed in 1968 as an amendment to the
1934 Act,74 was intended to close a significant gap in the dis-
closure requirements of the 1934 Act.75 Prior to 1968, federal
law regulated proxy contests for corporate control and stock-
for-stock exchange mergers, but cash tender offers were virtu-
ally unregulated. 76 Except for the antifraud provisions of sec-
tion 10(b), section 14(e) and Rule 10b-5, no provision of the
1934 Act required disclosure by the bidder or, for that matter,
by the target company.77 As a result, a target's shareholders
lacked both sufficient time and information with which to
evaluate an offer.7" One commentator went so far as to char-
acterize cash tender offers as "the last uncivilized frontier on
the corporate takeover landscape."79 When finally passed, the
Williams Act was based largely on the proxy regulations al-
ready in place.8"
"' Senate Bill Number 510, sponsored by Senator Harrison Williams (D. N.J).
Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified at sections 13 and 14 of the 1934 Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e) and 78n(d)-(f) (1988)).
" James F. Jorden and David R. Woodward, An Appraisal of Disclosure Re-
quirements in Contests for Control Under the Williams Act, 46 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
817, 825-26 (1978); William C. Tyson, The Proper Relationship Between Federal
and State Law in the Regulation of Tender Offers, 66 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 241,
242-43, (1990). Courts also acknowledged the gap in the disclosure requirements.
See Finnegan v. Campeau Corp., 915 F.2d 824, 829 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1624 (1991); Prudent Real Estate Trust v. Johncamp Realty, 599 F.2d
1140, 1144-45 (2d Cir. 1979); General Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert, 556 F.2d 90, 94
(1st Cir. 1977); GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls
Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 945 (2d Cir. 1969); Koppers Co., Inc. v. American Express
Co., 689 F. Supp. 1371, 1383 (W.D. Pa. 1988).
"' See Tyson, supra note 75, at 249.
7 Jorden & Woodward, supra note 75, at 825 (existing law did not require bid-
der to disclose identity, source of funds, or plans for target company once it was
acquired); Tyson, supra note 75, at 249 (cash tender offeror could operate in al-
most complete secrecy, with no obligation to make disclosures to target company's
shareholders when making bid).
" Jorden & Woodward, supra note 75, at 825-26; Tyson, supra note 75, at 249-
50.
79 Jorden & Woodward, supra note 75, at 825 (quoting Benjamin Vandegrift,
Section 13(d) Disclosure: Guidelines for Group Therapists, 16 B.C. IND. & COM. L.
REV. 459, 460 (1975)).
8' Tyson, supra note 75, at 251. Some questioned the wisdom of basing regula-
tion of cash tender offers on existing proxy rules because, unlike a proxy contest
where the shareholder retains his investment in the company, the shareholder in
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The bill originally introduced by Senator Harrison Wil-
liams81 was criticized because it avowedly favored incumbent
management.82 However, after extensive hearings revealed
that a hostile tender offer was the most effective way to flush
out "entrenched, inefficient management," a different bill
stressing neutrality between bidders and target management
was passed.' Senator Williams explained, "We have taken ex-
treme care to avoid tipping the scales in favor of management
or in favor of the person making the takeover bids."'
It is now widely accepted that, by setting forth an exten-
sive disclosure scheme, Congress's two main objectives in pass-
ing the Williams Act were to protect investors by requiring full
and fair disclosure, and to "preserv[e] the vitality of the tender
offer process through regulatory neutrality.""5 Stated other-
wise, the disclosure scheme enacted by the Williams Act and
the tender offer rules promulgated by the SEC thereunder
provide a target company's shareholders sufficient time and
information with which to make informed decisions as to
whether to tender their shares.s6 To a large extent, the goals
the cash tender offer will give up part or all of his investment. As a result, some
argued, requiring information about the bidder and future management would be
unnecessary. Jorden & Woodward, supra note 75, at 827. This argument was re-
jected because shareholders who had to make the initial decision as to whether to
tender their shares would base their decision on the nature and quality of future
management-information provided only in mandatory disclosure documents. Id.
S, . 2731, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
8 See Jorden & Woodward, supra note 75, at 827-28 (citing 111 CONG. REC,
28,257 (1965) (statement of Senator Williams); Tyson, supra note 75, at 250.
' Jorden & Woodward, supra note 75, at 827 (citing S. REP. No. 550, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 and H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968); Tyson,
supra note 75, at 251.
" Tyson, supra note 75, at 252 (citing 113 CONG. REC. 24,664 (1967))
(statement of Senator Williams). Courts, too, recognize the neutrality of the Wil-
liams Act in emphasizing that Congress intended neither to impose unrealistic
disclosure requirements on bidders nor to give target company management a
weapon with which to defeat the offer. See Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422
U.S. 49, 58-59 (1975); Finnegan v. Campeau Corp., 915 F.2d 824, 829 (2d Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1624 (1991); General Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert, 556
F.2d 90, 95 (1st Cir. 1977); IU Int'l v. NX Acquis. Corp., 840 F.2d 220, 222 (4th
Cir. 1988); Koppers Co., Inc. v. American Express Co., 689 F. Supp. 1371, 1383
(W.D. Pa. 1988).
' Tyson, supra note 75, at 252; see Jorden & Woodward, supra note 75, at
826; Kenneth M. Tallering, Note, Target Corporation Disclosure of Soft Information
in Tender Offer Contests, 54 FORDHAm L. REV. 825, 826 (1986).
' J. Robert Brown, Corporate Communications and the Federal Securities Laws,
52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 741 (1985) (goal of Williams Act was to reduce pressure
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of the Williams Act mirror the goals of the 1934 Act. Indeed, in
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,7 the Supreme Court
held that a fundamental purpose of the 1934 Act was "to sub-
stitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of
caveat emptor."88 Full and fair disclosure, however, was in-
tended to enable shareholders to make informed investment
decisions, not to enable them to litigate the substantive fair-
ness of the transaction.89
2. Substantive Provisions: Sections 13(d), 14(d) and 13(e)
Section 13(d) ° and the regulations promulgated thereun-
der require any person who acquires directly or indirectly ben-
eficial ownership of more than five percent of an issuer's secu-
rities to file a disclosure schedule with the SEC within ten
days of crossing the five-percent threshold.9'
on target's shareholders so that investors could make informed decisions about
whether to tender their shares).
375 U.S. 180 (1963).
Id. at 186; accord Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 463, 477-78 (1977);
Taylor v. First Union Corp. of South Carolina, 857 F.2d 240, 246 (4th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1080 (1989). As recently as Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224
(1988), the Court reiterated that the 1934 Act was intended to provide material
information to shareholders: "Disclosure, and not paternalistic withholding of accu-
rate information, is the policy chosen and expressed by Congress." Id. at 234.
8' Litigating the substantive terms of a transaction arises most frequently in
the context of a Rule 13E-3 or "freeze-out merger." 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1993).
In a freeze-out merger, a corporation which is the majority owner of its stock
makes a tender offer for its remaining shares. Rule 13e-3 requires that sharehold-
ers receive certain information concerning the merger, including the fairness of
offer. See infra notes 120-21 and accompanying text. Frequently, minority share-
holders will sue the corporation claiming that the offer price is unfair, and that
the corporation filed a false and misleading proxy statement by claiming in its
proxy statement the offer price was fair. See generally Santa Fe Indus. v. Green,
430 U.S. 463, 479 (1977) (unfairness of freeze-out merger should be litigated in
state courts); Nobles v. First Carolina Communications, Inc., 929 F.2d 141, 145
(4th Cir. 1991) (limited partner's inability to affect buy-back of his interest ren-
dered misstatements in proxy statement immaterial as a matter of law); In re
Craftmatic Sec. Litig., 890 F.2d 628, 639 (3d Cir. 1989) ("The line between a ma-
terial nondisclosure and the nondisclosure of mere mismanagement is often diffi-
cult to draw."); Taylor v. First Union Corp. of South Carolina, 857 F.2d at 246
("Federal securities law was not intended to provide a federal forum for every
intracorporate squabble ... ."). But cf Plane v. McCabe, 797 F.2d 713, 722 (9th
Cir. 1986) (disclosure violations going to fairness actionable under securities laws).
" 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1988).
9' Some commentators are critical of the ten-day window because the acquiror
may continue to acquire the issuer's stock until it files its disclosure schedule. See
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Congress explicitly required that certain information enumer-
ated in the statute be disclosed in the schedule,
92 but gave the
SEC broad authority to require "such additional informa-
tion... as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors."93 Pursuant to this authority,
the SEC promulgated regulations94 requiring the filing of
Schedule 13D,95 which contains numerous line-item disclosure
provisions." "Section 13(d)'s filing requirements are aimed at
creeping acquisitions and open market or privately negotiated
large block purchases."97 The reason for requiring such disclo-
sure is clear: a person or corporation that acquires large
amounts of shares in a corporation may intend either to seek
control of the corporation, or simply to make an investment in
the corporation. Public disclosure of such information may tend
to affect the corporation's share price by reflecting the attrac-
tiveness of that corporation either as a long-term investment
opportunity or as a potential takeover target.98
Section 14(d)99 "establishes the primary disclosure obliga-
tions of the tender offeror.""'0 It requires that all tender offer
material for equity securities be filed with the SEC, along with
appropriate disclosures similar to those required under Section
13(d),10' and such other information as the SEC might re-
HAZEN, supra note 28, § 11.10, at 515.
2 Section 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1991). Congress specifically required
disclosure of: (A) the background, identity and nature of beneficial ownership; (B)
the source and amount of funds used to purchase the shares; (C) if the purpose of
the purchase is to gain control of the company, any plans or proposals the
acquiror has for the company; and (D) the number of shares beneficially owned or
for which there exists a right to acquire.
93 Id.
94 Rule 13d-l(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(a) (1993).
9 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1993).
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13D-100 (1993). Schedule 13D's line-item provisions man-
date disclosure of: the Security and Issuer (Item 1); Interest in Securities of the
Issuer (Item 5); Contracts, Arrangements, Understandings or Relationships with
Respect to Securities of the Issuer (Item 6); and, Material to be Filed as Exhibits
(Item 7).
5 HAZEN, supra note 28, § 11.13, at 527.
' Accordingly, a reasonable shareholder would consider the fact that a person
or corporation has acquired at least five percent of the issuer's shares impor-
tant-or material-in deciding whether to sell, hold or acquire more shares in the
issuer.
" 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1988).
100 Tyson, supra note 75, at 255.
101 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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quire. 10 2 Pursuant to the authority granted to it under Sec-
tion 14(d)(1), the SEC promulgated rules 3 requiring that the
bidder file a Schedule 14D-1"°4 with the SEC. Like the re-
quirements of Schedule 13D, Schedule 14D-1 contains line-
item provisions requiring the disclosure of specifically enumer-
ated information. 5 Section 14(d) also added certain proce-
dural requirements regarding the conduct of tender offers
which, when supplemented by the SEC's rules, substantively
ameliorated the rights of the target's shareholders."°
Section 14(d)(4) of the 1934 Act"0 7 governs the disclosure
obligations of the target company by requiring that "[amny so-
licitation or recommendation to the holders of... a security to
accept or reject a tender. . . shall be made in accordance with
such rules and regulations as the Commission may pre-
scribe."' Significantly, section 14(d)(4) is one of two Wil-
liams Act tender offer provisions that do not enumerate spe-
" Section 14(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1988). HAZEN, supra note 28, § 11.14,
at 534-35; Tyson, supra note 75, at 255.
10 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3(b) (1993).
10 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1993).
' See, e.g., supra note 96.
10 Jorden & Woodward, supra note 75, at 819; Moylan, supra note 53, at 564-
66; Tyson, supra note 75, at 258-59. For instance, section 14(d)(5) of the 1934 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1988), permits shareholders to withdraw shares tendered
within seven days of the commencement of the offer, and anytime after the expira-
tion of sixty days from the date of the offer if the bidder has not paid for shares
tendered prior to that time. Section 14(d)(6) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(dX6)
(1988), requires that, if the tender offer is for less than all the outstanding shares
of the target company, the bidder must accept pro rata any shares tendered with-
in the first ten days of the offer. Section 14(d)(7) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78n(d)(7) (1988), requires a bidder who changes the terms of the offer by increas-
ing the amount of consideration to pay the higher price to all tendering sharehold-
ers, regardless of whether they tendered their shares prior to or after the increase
was announced. See Moylan, supra note 53, at 566; HAZEN, supra note 119, §
11.14 at 540; Tyson, supra note 75, at 259 n.85. Finally, the SEC, in Rule 14d-10,
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (1993), adopted two additional substantive requirements
which were intended to prevent offerors from discriminating among target share-
holders.
From the foregoing, it would appear that some of the tender offer provisions
of the Williams Act, when augmented by the SEC's rules, have as much to do
with regulating the substantive fairness of the offer itself as they do with ensur-
ing full and fair disclosure. Nevertheless, by requiring fair and equal treatment of
all shareholders, the interplay between the Williams Act and the SEC's rules al-
lows shareholders to make informed investment decisions, which is the preeminent
purpose of the Williams Act and the 1934 Act. See Tyson, supra note 75, at 260.




cific, statutory disclosure obligations. Instead, in these two
areas, the SEC has nearly plenary authority to establish dis-
closure requirements."9
Pursuant to section 14(d)(4), the SEC promulgated Rule
14d-9,"' which requires any person or corporation to file a
Schedule 14D-9.' as soon as practicable". after recom-
mending that the target's shareholders either accept or reject
the offer. 113 Like Schedules 13D and 14D-1, Schedule 14D-9
contains various line-item provisions calling for the disclosure
of certain information. Section 14(d)(4) and the rules promul-
gated thereunder are a perfect example of the Williams Act's
attempt to maintain regulatory neutrality between bidders and
target management. By requiring the bidder as well as the
target to make disclosures, shareholders are far better
equipped to make informed investment decisions."'
Finally, section 13(e)(1) of the 1934 Act"5 gives the SEC
,' See generally Brown, supra note 11, at 102 ("securities laws provide the
Commission with exceedingly broad, almost plenary, authority to impose affirma-
tive disclosure requirements.") (footnote omitted). Section 13(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e)
(1988), also gives the SEC broad authority to regulate certain types of tender
offers without requiring specific, statutory disclosure requirements. By contrast,
sections 13(d) and 14(d), while giving the SEC authority to promulgate further dis-
closure requirements, contain statutory disclosure requirements.
110 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9 (1993). Rule 14d-9 provides, in relevant part:
(a) Filing and Transmittal of Recommendation Statement. No solicitation
or recommendation to security holders shall be made by any person de-
scribed in paragraph (d) of this section with respect to a tender offer...
unless as soon as practicable on the date such solicitation or recommen-
dation is first published or sent or given to security holders such person
complies with the following sub-paragraphs.
(1) Such person shall file with the Commission eight copies of a
Tender Offer Solicitation/Recommendation Statement on Schedule
14D-9.
. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (1993).
2 Rule 14e-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1993), requires that the target company
send a statement concerning its position on the tender offer within ten days of
when the offer is announced. Because this statement is a solicita-
tion/recommendation statement within the meaning of Rule 14d-9, the company is
thus obligated to file a Schedule 14D-9 in accordance with Rule 14d-9(a). See
Amanda Acquis. Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984 (E.D. Wis.),
affd, 877 F.2d 446 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989); Newell Co. v.
Vermont Am. Corp., 725 F. Supp. 351, 369 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
" 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9 (1993). Rule 14d-9 is not limited to the target compa-
ny itself. Any person or corporation recommending that an offer either be accepted
or rejected must fie a Schedule 14D-9. See Tyson, supra note 75, at 257-58.
" Id. See also Gaillard, supra note 53, at 1189; Moylan, supra note 53, at 564.
11 15 U.S.C. § 78m(3)(1) (1988).
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broad authority to regulate an issuer's repurchases of its stock.
Section 13(e)(1) makes it unlawful for an issuer to purchase its
own stock unless it complies with such rules as the SEC may
promulgate."6 Pursuant to this authority, the SEC promul-
gated Rules 13e-1 to 13e-4."' Rule 13e-11 8 prohibits an is-
suer from purchasing its own stock after a tender offer has
been made unless the issuer files with the SEC a disclosure
statement."' Rule 13e-3120 pertains to "going private"-or
"freeze-out"-transactions, 1 and prohibits the company from
engaging in a Rule 13e-3 transaction without filing with the
SEC a Schedule 13E-3.1 2 Finally, Rule 13e-4' requires an
issuer that is the subject of a tender offer to file a Schedule
13E-4 24 before launching a tender offer for its own stock.'
In sum, the regulatory scheme that the SEC has enacted
under each major section of the Williams Act provides for the
filing of a disclosure statement with the SEC. These require-
ments, apart from any attempt to regulate the substantive
fairness of tender offers, have but one clear objective: they
provide shareholders with sufficient information with which to
make informed investment decisions. Sections 13(d) and
14(d)(1) each require disclosure of specific information that
Congress obviously considered crucial to an informed invest-
ment decisions; those requirements have been incorporated
into the SEC's mandatory disclosure statements. Sections
14(d)(4) and 13(e) do not contain similar statutory disclosure
requirements. Nevertheless, by. giving the SEC broad authority
to regulate in those areas, it is evident that Congress perceived
a need for further regulation-including disclosure--in these
areas.
116 Id.
"7 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-1-.13e-4 (1993).
118 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-1 (1993).
119 Id.
'2 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1993).
12' A "going private" transaction (freeze-out merger) is a purchase or tender
offer by the issuer of its shares that would lead to the cessation of reporting obli-
gations under the 1934 Act. Rule 13e-3(a)(3)(ii), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(a)(3Xii)
(1993); see HAZEN, supra note 28, § 11.17, at 553-54.
"2 Schedule 13E-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1993).
1'2 Rule 13e-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4 (1993).
'2 Schedule 13E-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-101 (1993).
" HAZEN, supra note 28, § 11.17, at 553.
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II. THE KERN CASE
A. The Facts"
On September 4, 1986, Allied issued a press release re-
vealing that Robert Campeau, Chairman of the Board and
Chief Executive Officer of Campeau, had sent a letter to Thom-
as Macioce, the Chief Executive Officer of Allied, offering to
acquire Allied in a negotiated merger transaction by exchang-
ing cash and securities for Allied's common stock.' On Sep-
tember 11, 1986, Allied issued a press release announcing that
its board of directors had rejected Campeau's invitation.2 '
The next day Campeau launched a tender offer for sixty per-
cent of Allied's shares at fifty-eight dollars per share, a deal
worth $1.74 billion.'29
In response to the hostile offer, Allied's investment banker,
Goldman, Sachs, Co. ("Goldman Sachs"), began to consider
various defensive tactics. 30 Among the options considered
was a recapitalization plan that would have involved the sale
of several of Allied's shopping centers and a special dividend
for Allied's shareholders. Representatives of Allied-including
Mr. Kern-and the Edward J. DeBartolo Corporation
("DeBartolo") met to discuss the sale of Allied's shopping cen-
ters to DeBartolo. 3' Over the next week, the parties engaged
in negotiations concerning the identity and the price of the
" The facts described in this section are culled mainly from the Division's
Order Instituting Proceedings, In re George C. Kern, Jr., Admin. Proc. File No. 3-
6869, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,142 (June 29, 1987)
[hereinafter Order Instituting Proceedings], and from Judge Blair's findings of fact,
which were reported in his Initial Decision, supra note 18.
' Allied Stores Comments on Campeau Offer, PR Newswire, Sept. 4, 1986,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File; Order Instituting Proceedings,
supra note 126, at 88,764, T 10; Initial Decision, supra note 18, at 89,581.
1 Allied Stores Does Not Accept Campeau Offer, PR Newswire, Sept. 11, 1986,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File; Order Instituting Proceedings,
supra note 126, at 88,764, 1 11; Initial Decision, supra note 18, at 89,581.
1 Campeau Launches Takeover Bid for Allied Stores, Reuters Ltd., Sept. 12,
1986, available in LXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File; Order Instituting Proceed-
ings, supra note 126, at 88,764, 1 13; Initial Decision, supra note 18, at 89,581.
" Order Instituting Proceedings, supra note 126, at 88,764, 1 13; Initial Deci-
sion, supra note 18, at 89,581.
.31 Order Instituting Proceedings, supra note 126, at 88,764-65, 91 13, 17-20;
Initial Decision, supra note 18, at 89,581-82.
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shopping centers.'32 On September 24, 1986, Allied issued a
press release indicating that its Board of Directors had deter-
mined that the tender offer was not in the best interests of its
shareholders and recommending that shareholders not tender
their shares to Campeau."' On the same day, Allied filed
with the SEC its Schedule 14D-9."' By September 25, 1986,
Edward J. DeBartolo, Sr., head of DeBartolo, had agreed to
pay $405 million for six shopping centers, contingent on a
report on the quality of the malls in question. 3 ' On Septem-
ber 29 and 30, 1986, Goldman Sachs and several of Allied's
representatives approached various banks with respect to the
proposed recapitalization. Previously, however, on September
29, 1986, Campeau had increased its offer to sixty-six dollars
per share for eighty percent of Allied's common stock. 3 '
Thus, the recapitalization was no longer more attractive to
Allied's shareholders than the Campeau offer, and Allied in-
1Id.
13 Allied Stores Campeau Offer not in Allied's Best Interest, PR Newswire, Sept.
24, 1986, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File.
1" Item 7(a) of Allied's original Schedule 14D-9 stated:
At its September 23, 1986 meeting, the Board considered and reviewed
the feasibility and desirability of exploring and investigating certain types
of possible transactions, including without limitation, a change in the
present capitalization of the Company, the public or private sale of
Shares or other securities of the Company to another company or person,
the acquisition by the Company of Shares by tender offer or otherwise,
the acquisition by the Company of all or part of the business of another
company or person, and the acquisition of one or more of its significant
business segments of the Company or of certain of its assets or a portion
of its Shares by another company or person. After considerable discus-
sion, the Board resolved that it was desirable and in the best interests of
the Company and its stockholders to continue to explore and investigate,
with the assistance and advice of Goldman Sachs, such transactions,
although the Board noted that the initiation or continuation of such ac-
tivities may be dependent upon future actions with respect to the Offer.
There can be no assurance that these activities will result in any trans-
action being recommended to the Board or that any transaction which
may be recommended will be authorized or consummated. The Proposal
or consummation of any transaction of the type referred to in this Item 7
may have an impact on the Offer.
Allied's Schedule 14D-9 filed with the SEC (Sept. 23, 1986) (emphasis added).
' Id. Moreover, Thomas Macioce was prepared to recommend to Allied's board
of directors that they accept the $405 million offer. Initial Decision, supra note 18,
at 89,582.
"3 Campeau Raises Offer for Allied Stores, PR Newswire, Sept. 29, 1986, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File; Order Instituting Proceedings, supra
note 126, at 88,765, 27; Initial Decision, supra note 18, at 89,584.
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Over the next four days, representatives-including out-
side counsel-of Allied, DeBartolo and Paul Bilzerian, a well-
known corporate raider, engaged in intensive negotiations
concerning the terms of the proposed merger between Allied
and an entity jointly owned by DeBartolo and Bilzerian."
9
Goldman Sachs provided Shearson Lehman Brothers
("Shearson"), DeBartolo's investment banker, with nonpublic
information so that Shearson could better evaluate the deal be-
tween DeBartolo and Allied.4 ' During these negotiations, the
parties discussed a sixty-five dollars per share tender offer for
Allied's common stock, the all-cash nature of the second step
merger, break-up fees if the deal failed to materialize and the
fate of Allied's employee stock option and profit-sharing plans.
By October 1, 1986, the parties exchanged drafts of the merger
agreement in anticipation of another meeting the next morn-
ing.'4' On October 2, 1986, the parties met to discuss the fi-
nal price of the merger and, after Goldman Sachs and
Shearson presented various alternatives, the parties finally
agreed on a price of sixty-seven dollars per share.'
On Friday, October 3, 1986, Allied's Board of Directors
unanimously approved the merger and authorized Allied's
management to execute the merger agreement, contingent
upon DeBartolo's receipt of financing commitments necessitat-
ed by the agreement.' 3 That evening, Allied learned that
DeBartolo had encountered difficulty obtaining financing. Over
the weekend, DeBartolo met with various lenders, who in-
formed the parties that the lenders would meet early Monday
1" A "white knight" is a friendly third-party bidder who agrees to acquire the
target company, thereby foiling the hostile bidder's takeover attempt. See also
Initial Decision, supra note 18, at 89,584 n.10.
1" Order Instituting Proceedings, supra note 126, at 88,765, 9 28; Initial Deci-
sion, supra note 18, at 89,584.
139 Order Instituting Proceedings, supra note 126, at 88,765-66, 91 29-33; Initial
Decision, supra note 18, at 89,584.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Order Instituting Proceedings, supra note 126, at 88,766, 39; Initial Deci-
sion, supra note 18, at 89,586.
1 Order Instituting Proceedings, supra note 126, at 88,766, 9 40; Initial Deci-
sion, supra note 18, at 89,586-87.
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morning to determine whether the financing arrangements
were satisfactory.'"
Finally, on Tuesday evening, October 7, 1986, DeBartolo
received the necessary financing commitments, and Allied and
DeBartolo executed the merger agreement. " 5 The next day,
Allied filed with the Commission an amendment to its Sched-
ule 14D-9, again advising shareholders to reject Campeau's
offer, disclosing the meeting at which the merger was approved
some five days earlier and disclosing the subsequent execution
of the merger agreement on October 7.146
The Division alleged that four separate developments
should have been disclosed promptly in an amendment to
Allied's Schedule 14D-9: (1) the negotiations concerning the
recapitalization;47 (2) the negotiations with DeBartolo con-
cerning a white knight acquisition; " (3) the agreement in
principle that the parties reached on October 3, 1986;14' and
'" Order Instituting Proceedings, supra note 126, at 88,767, 45; Initial Deci-
sion, supra note 18, at 89,587. Since Allied and DeBartolo anticipated that they
would consummate the merger on Monday morning, October 6, 1986, Allied re-
quested a halt in the trading of its shares in anticipation of the announcement of
the merger agreement. After Allied learned that DeBartolo's troubles with the
lenders persisted, however, trading resumed and no announcement was made. Id.
14" Order Instituting Proceedings, supra note 126, at 88,767, 1 46; Initial Deci-
sion, supra note 18, at 89,587.
" Edward DeBartolo, Allied Stores Merge, PR Newswire, Oct. 8, 1986, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File; Order Instituting Proceedings, supra note
126, at 88,767, 47; Initial Decision, supra note 18, at 89,587. Eventually, the
merger with DeBartolo collapsed because Campeau, in a "street sweep," succeeded
in purchasing a majority of Allied's shares on the open market. See Isadore
Barmash, Judge Bars Campeau's Allied Step, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 25, 1986, at A33
(revealing that a federal court had enjoined the second step of Campeau's tender
offer, and that Campeau, which had been involved in litigation with Allied to
block the merger with DeBartolo, had bought a majority of Allied's stock on the
open market). All legal disputes were eventually settled and Campeau, which by
then held a large majority of Allied's shares, voted them in favor of the merger.
147 The Division contended that Schedule 14D-9, Item 7(aX2) required that these
negotiations be disclosed in that they concerned the sale of a "material amount of
[the company's] assets." Order Instituting Proceedings, supra note 126, at 88,765,
24.
1 The Division alleged that Schedule 14D-9, Item 7(a)(1) required that these
negotiations be disclosed in that they concerned "an extraordinary transaction such
as a merger or reorganization." Order Instituting Proceedings, supra note 126, at
88,765, 36.
..9 The Division claimed that Schedule 14D-9, Item 7(b) required that this de-
velopment be disclosed because it was an agreement in principle which pertained
to an item that must be disclosed under Rule 14d-9, Item 7(a). Order Instituting
Proceedings, supra note 126, at 88,766-67, 39, 44-48.
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(4) Allied's October 3, 1986, Board Resolution authorizing the
execution of a merger agreement with DeBartolo contingent
upon DeBartolo's obtaining the requisite financing commit-
ments."' 0
B. The Administrative Hearing
The SEC commenced an administrative proceeding against
Allied and Mr. Kern under section 15(c)(4) of the 1934 Act.'
5'
The SEC sought to demonstrate that Mr. Kern, as
decisionmaker for Allied, had caused Allied to violate section
14(d)(4) of the 1934 Act and Rules 14d-9 and 14d-9(b). The
SEC also sought an order requiring Mr. Kern to comply gener-
ally with securities laws in the future.
The testimony adduced at the Hearing revealed that there
was a fundamental dispute between Mr. Kern's interpretation
of Rule 14d-9(b)'s "material change" language as it relates to
Item 7(a)(1) of Schedule 14D-9, and the Division's interpreta-
tion of those rules. In its opening argument, the Division antic-
ipated Mr. Kern's defense that the events under scrutiny were
not material:
The Respondent will argue, we believe, that the fact of the negotia-
tions, and the agreement in principle, and the board resolution were
not material. But the Commission has determined that negotiations,
agreements in principle, and board of directors resolutions by a
company subject to a tender offer are per se material. That determi-
nation is clearly expressed in the instructions to Schedule 14D-9. It
is not, we submit, for individual regulated parties to substitute their
judgment for that of the Commission.'52
Mr. Kern, by contrast, argued that Allied's original Sched-
ule 14D-915 already disclosed that negotiations might be un-
derway that could lead to a merger or a recapitalization. 1"4
Since DeBartolo's financing commitments were not in
place-either for the shopping center deal or for the white
150 Id.
151 See supra note 17.
15 HT. 33-34 (emphasis added).
' See supra note 134. Allied's original Schedule 14D-9, Item 7(a) disclosed that
"[alfter considerable discussion, the Board resolved that it was desirable and in
the best interests of the Company and its stockholders to continue to explore and




knight merger-the probability of a merger occurring was
extremely low. Thus, the negotiations did not constitute a
material change in the information already disclosed, according
to Mr. Kern.'55 With respect to what "material" meant for
purposes of a "material change in the information," senior
Sullivan & Cromwell litigation partner Marvin Schwartz ar-
gued:
What does "material" mean? The Commission, itself, and the courts
in case after case, in dealing with merger and acquisition situations,
sales of assets situations, and, indeed, the Solicitor General in his
recent brief on behalf of the Commission in the Supreme Court in
Basic v. Levinson, have told us quite clearly what "material" means
in those contexts. It means that a transaction or discussions or nego-
tiations are material when a transaction is probable as a result of
those discussions or negotiations. That, I submit to your honor, is
the law.5 '
Mr. Schwartz further argued that whether or not a merger was
probable called for judgment on the part of the person charged
with disclosure decisions.
157
Therein lay the fundamental difference between the posi-
tions of the Division and Mr. Kern. The Division believed that
Item 7 of Schedule 14D-9 left Mr. Kern no room for judg-
ment-he should have disclosed the negotiations when they
occurred, as the rule apparently requires. By contrast, Mr.
Kern argued that because Rule 14d-9(b) required disclosure of
only material changes, he was obligated to assess the material-
"s HT. 45-46.158 Id.
15 HT. 46. Mr. Schwartz asked, "What could clearly be more a matter ofjudg-
ment than an assessment today of the probability of an event occurring two weeks
hence or even two days hence? That is what this case is about." Id. (emphasis
added). In light of the Division's argument that section 15(c)(4)'s "knew or should
have known" language required only a showing of negligence-an argument that
Judge Blair ultimately accepted-Mr. Kern's argument that Rule 14d-9(b) called for
him to exercise judgment by performing an independent materiality analysis took
on great significance. By showing that his judgments were in line with those of
other securities practitioners, Mr. Kern asserted that he had acted with a reason-
able degree of professional care. Thus, he concluded, he could not have negligently
caused Allied's disclosure violations. HT. 46-47; Post-Hearing Brief of respondent
George Kern at 85-86 (on file with the author). Some of the most well-respected
securities practitioners in the field, Martin Lipton, Professor Louis Loss, Robert
Mundheim and former SEC Commissioner Francis Wheat, testified that Mr. Kern's
actions as a professional were reasonable under the circumstances. HT. 555, 764-
65, 797-800 and 822-23.
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ity of the information constituting the change, using the ac-
cepted tests for materiality set forth in the case law. Aside
from the SEC's authority to bring the proceeding in the first
instance, this difference in interpretation was one of the most
important legal issues that arose in Kern. Although the ALJ
found Mr. Kern liable, he adopted Mr. Kern's argument that
Rule 14d-9(b) required him to apply Basic's materiality test to
the negotiations at issue, a decision which, this Comment as-
serts, was erroneous.
C. The Initial Decision
In his Initial Decision, Chief SEC Administrative Law
Judge Warren Blair found that Mr. Kern was the cause of
Allied's failure to amend its Schedule 14d-9.
5 ' Judge Blair
also concluded that section 15(c)(4)'s "knew or should have
known" language5 9 required a showing of only negligence on
Mr. Kern's part, and that Mr. Kern had "neglected to give due
care and consideration to the need for amendment."
60
Judge Blair employed a two-tiered analysis for each corpo-
rate event that the Division contended should have been dis-
closed. First, he analyzed the language of Allied's original Item
7 disclosure, comparing it to the subsequent events at is-
sue. '' Judge Blair concluded that Allied's original Item 7 dis-
closure failed to reveal the negotiations in connection with the
sale of the shopping centers, and the board resolution and
agreement in principle related to the white knight 
merger.162
Significantly, in response to Mr. Kern's argument that Allied's
original Item 7(a) disclosure was sufficient to inform the mar-
ket that negotiations concerning the corporate events at issue
were occurring, Judge Blair noted that:
Allied's disclosure in Item 7(a) of its Schedule 14D-9 that Allied's
Board had "resolved that it was desirable and in the best interests of
the Company and its stockholders to continue to explore and investi-
gate" certain types of transactions including acquisition by another
company of one or more of Allied's business segments did not encom-
' Initial Decision, supra note 18, at 89,592-93.
159 See supra note 17.
1 Initial Decision, supra note 18, at 89,592-93.




pass what must be deemed negotiations for the shopping centers
that took place on September 25 .... The words "explore" and "in-
vestigate" imply efforts by Allied to locate transactions in keeping
with the Board's resolution, but do not suggest that a specific trans-
action of the magnitude of the sale of Allied's shopping centers
would become the subject of on-going negotiations on September25 .... 1
Second, having concluded that the corporate events at
issue were not disclosed in Allied's original Item 7 disclosure,
Judge Blair then proceeded to assess whether the events in
question were material "within the meaning of Rule 14d-
9(b)."' He concluded that Basic, Inc. v. Levinson65 provid-
ed the "controlling guidelines."' Applying the tests for mate-
riality adopted in Basic,17 Judge Blair concluded that the
events in question were material and, thus, should have been
disclosed."
Judge Blair discontinued the proceedings, however, with-
out entering an order against Mr. Kern. He concluded that he
did not have the authority under section 15(c)(4) to order a
respondent who no longer represented a company, the disclo-
sures of which he had caused to be deficient, to comply gener-
ally with the securities laws in the future.'69 Instead, he rea-
soned that section 15(c)(4) would allow only the entry of an
order directing a respondent to correct a past, erroneous filing.
Since Mr. Kern no longer represented Allied, and because
Allied was no longer a public company, no order could be en-
tered against Mr. Kern.170
"7 Id. at 89,582-83 (emphasis added). Judge Blair reached a similar conclusion
with respect to the white knight negotiations. Id. at 89,585.
" Id. at 89,583, 89,585, 89,587-88.
"6 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
" Initial Decision, supra note 18, at 89,583. Agreeing with Mr. Kern-and dis-
agreeing with the Division-Judge Blair apparently assumed that the word "mate-
rial" in Rule 14d-9(b) permitted persons charged with disclosure decisions under
Rules 14d-9 and 14d-9(b) to assess the significance of information contemplated for
disclosure. See infra notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
"7 See supra notes 52-72; see also supra note 12.
"7 See supra note 164.
" Initial Decision, supra note 18, at 89,593.
170 Id. at 89,595. At the time, the only method that the SEC could have used
to obtain an order requiring Mr. Kern to comply with securities laws in the future
would have been a suit in district court for injunctive relief under § 21(d) of the
1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1988). But in such a suit, the SEC would have been
required to show that Mr. Kern possessed a level of culpability higher than mere
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D. The Appeal to the Full Commission
Under an internal appeal provision, the full Commission
decided sua sponte to review all questions of law and fact
raised in the AL's decision. 7' In his brief, Mr. Kern argued,
as he had previously, that section 15(c)(4) did not authorize the
entry of an order requiring general future compliance. In addi-
tion, Mr. Kern vigorously attempted to portray the proceeding
as an attack on his professional judgment, and an improper at-
tempt by the SEC to subject his good faith legal judgments to
scrutiny.'72 The Division responded to that assertion by argu-
ing that Mr. Kern's actions as a decisionmaker, not his legal
advice as an attorney, were being questioned. This became one
of the central issues at oral argument before the Commis-
sion.'73
With regard to the merits, Mr. Kern repeated his argu-
ment that his original Item 7(a) disclosure was sufficient to
apprise investors that negotiations regarding the sale of
Allied's shopping centers and white knight negotiations were
underway.74 Mr. Kern further argued that, because the prob-
negligence. See, e.g., HAzEN, supra note 28, § 9.5 at 358-59.
m" The Commission made this decision under Rule 17(c) of its Rules of Practice,
17 C.F.R. § 201.17 (1993). SEC to Review Decision to End Proceeding Against
Attorney Kern, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 3 (Jan. 6, 1989).
1 See Brief Before the Commission of Respondent George C. Kern at 29-36
[hereinafter Respondent's Appellate Briet] (on file with the author). Indeed, this
aspect of Mr. Kern's argument has received considerable attention in the scholarly
literature. See James R. Doty et al., The Professional as Defendant, 755
P.L.IJCoRP. 681 (1991); Daniel L. Goelzer & Susan Ferris Wyderko, Rule 2(e)
Securities and Exchange Discipline of Professionals, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 652, 670-73
(1991); Eldon Olson, SEC Sanctions of Securities Counsel, 765 P.L.IJCorp. 473
(1992); Harvey L. Pitt et al., SEC Enforcement Actions An Overview of SEC En-
forcement Proceedings and Priorities, C700 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 167 (1991); Harvey L. Pitt
& Dixie L. Johnson, The Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform
Act of 1990 Provisions and Implications of the New Remedies Available to the
SEC, 718 P.L.IJCORP. 7 (1990); Richard H. Rowe, Trends in Potential Liability
Under the Federal Securities Laws for Rendering Legal Opinions in Securities
Transactions, 725 P.L.IJCORP. 473 (1991); Marc I. Steinberg, Attorney Liability
Under the Securities Laws, 45 Sw. L.J. 711 (1991); David B. Wilkins, Who Should
Regulate Lawyers, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1992).
'73 Appeal Transcript at 10-19, 38, 48-57 [hereinafter numbers preceded by "AT"
refer to the transcript of the oral argument before the full Commission, dated
June 8, 1989]. See also Kern's Status as Attorney is Central Issue at SEC Oral
Argument, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 847 (June 9, 1989).
"" Respondent's Appellate Brief, supra note 172, at 48-51. Mr. Kern previously
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ability of the negotiations leading to a significant corporate
event was low, and because DeBartolo lacked the necessary
financing to effectuate a white knight tender offer, there was
no material change in the information requiring disclosure.175
The Division weakly contended, as it had previously, that
Item 7's requirement that certain information be disclosed
rendered the information material per se.76 The Division also
argued much more forcefully that the information that Mr.
Kern had declined to disclose was material under the Basic
standard.7 7 At oral argument, though, the Division confined
itself to its initial position that Item 7 creates an affirmative
obligation to disclose the commencement of negotiations re-
gardless of their materiality, and that Allied's original Item 7
had failed to disclose the events under scrutiny. There was no
argument by the Division, nor did the Commission question
the Division, as to the materiality of the corporate events in issue.78
made this argument at the hearing and in his post-hearing Brief. HT. 44-45; Post-
Hearing Brief of Respondent George C. Kern at 19-27 (on file with the author).
175 Respondent's Appellate Brief, supra note 172, at 53-63; AT. 33, 70-72. Again,
Mr. Kern argued that the appropriate test for materiality was the NorthwaylTGS
test adopted in Basic. Id. at 10-11, 55; AT. 22-24.
171 Memorandum of Law of the Division of Enforcement at 26 (on file with the
author).
177 Id. at 30-39. Perhaps this tactic is best explained as an attempt by the
Division to "beat Mr. Kern at his own game," especially in light of the AU.'s deci-
sion adopting the NorthwaylTGS standard for which Mr. Kern had argued. See
supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
" Indeed, a review of the record reveals that most of the Commission's ques-
tions during the Division's argument centered on whether Allied's original Item 7
disclosed the existence of negotiations. AT. 44-48.
Only at one point during the Commission's questioning of the Division's law-
yer, Mark Kreitman, did the issue of a "material change in the information" arise.
Commissioner Fleischman asked whether the Commission's decision in In re
Revlon Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 23,320, [1986-87 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) T 84,006 (June 16, 1986) (consent decree finding that Revlon had
violated Rule 14d-9 and 14d-9(b) by failing to disclose the commencement of nego-
tiations where its original Item 7 disclosed only that Revlon's management would
continue to explore alternatives), had decided the issue of whether, subsequent to
the filing of the original 14d-9, the onset of negotiations referred to in Item 7(a)(1)
or (2) was a material change requiring disclosure (AT. 46-47). Mr. Kreitman re-
sponded, "Absolutely, Commissioner Fleischman. We think the language that
Revlon used to disclose, which the Commission found to be insufficient to disclose
the commencement of negotiations is equally insufficient with the language in
Allied." Id.
Commissioner Fleischman's implication that Revlon should be read as holding
that, as a matter of law, the onset of negotiations is a per se material change in
the information, is not so readily apparent. Revlon is much more instructive for its
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E. The Opinion of the Commission
Although seven different issues were presented for its
review,' 9 the Commission decided only one, holding that the
SEC had no authority to seek orders of general future compli-
ance under section 15(c)(4).' 0 With respect to the merits of
the case, the Commission ruled, "[iln view of our determination
not to impose orders of general future compliance under sec-
tion 15(c)(4), we affirm solely the law judge's determination to
discontinue these proceedings and reach none of the other mat-
ters addressed therein."'81
Whether or not the Commission was correct in concluding
that the Division had no authority to seek prospective relief
under section 15(c)(4) has been rendered moot by recent
amendments to federal securities laws.'82 While many ap-
definition of the term "negotiations" as that term is used in Item 7(a) of Schedule
14d-9. See infra notes 222-33 and accompanying text.
1 George Kern argued on appeal that:
(1) Section 15(c)(4) Does Not Authorize the Issuance of the Order Sought;
(2) This Proceeding Is an Inappropriate Attempt to Regulate the Legal
Profession; (3) Judge Blair Applied the Wrong Legal Standard; (4) Kern
Exercised Reasonable Professional Judgment; and (5) The Proceeding
Violates Kern's Constitutional Right to a Fair Hearing.
Respondent's Appellate Brief, supra note 172, at i-ii.
The Division argued on appeal that:
(1) The Evidence at Trial Established that Allied Violated Rule 14d-9(b),
that Kern Was a Cause of the Violation, and that Kern Should Have
Known his Conduct Would Contribute to Allied's Violation; (2) Section
15(c)(4) Authorizes the Commission to Enter an Order Directing Kern to
Comply with Section 14(d)(4) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14d-9; and
(3) The Law Judge Erred in Excluding Kern's Well's Submission From
Evidence.
Memorandum of Law of the Division of Enforcement, supra note 21, at i-ii.
" In re George C. Kern, Jr., Exchange Act Release No. 29,356, [1991 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 84,815 (June 21, 1991).
... Id. at 82,008. Two inferences can be drawn from the Commission's failure to
reach the merits. The Commission may have considered its decision as a dismissal
on jurisdictional grounds, thereby rendering the AJ's decision a nullity. On the
other hand, the Commission may have viewed its decision as merely a procedural
interpretation, which would not result in the dismissal of the prior decision, espe-
cially if it believed that the AIJ had applied the correct law to the facts. This
Comment assumes that the Commission's failure to reach the merits constitutes
neither an affirmance nor a rejection of the AI_'s factual and legal conclusions.
Thus, the AUJ's decision stands as binding precedent on the securities bar.
" See The Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of
1990 (codified at Section 21C(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(a) (Supp. III
1991)), which gives the SEC broad authority to issue cease and desist orders and
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plauded the SEC's decision actually limiting its own authori-
ty-an exceedingly rare event in the field of Administrative
Law-the decision left many in the securities bar without any
guidance on one of the most important issues presented to the
Commission for review: 83 Are the negotiations required to be
disclosed under Item 7(a)(1) of Schedule 14D-9 material per se
and does Rule 14d-9(b)'s "material change" language permit
the target company to assess the materiality of merger negoti-
ations specifically required to be disclosed under Item 7(a)(1)
when deciding whether to amend its Schedule 14D-9?
III. ANALYSIS
Three separate and distinct grounds exist for finding that
both Mr. Kern and the AUJ were incorrect in using Basic or
any materiality test to determine, for purposes of amendment,
the materiality of the negotiations at issue. The one with the
deepest implications for securities laws, however, is that the
SEC, in promulgating Item 7(a) of Schedule 14D-9, had al-
ready concluded that preliminary merger negotiations occur-
ring during the pendency of a tender offer are material." Ac-
to order respondents to comply with the securities laws. Moreover, the scope of
the SEC's authority to sanction securities lawyers has been the subject of many
scholarly articles. See supra note 172; see also William R. McLucas & Laurie
Romanowich, SEC Enforcement Proceedings under Section 15(c)(4) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 41 Bus. LAw. 145 (1985); William R. McLucas et al., Reme-
dies Available in SEC Enforcement Actions, 528 P.L.IJCoRp. 857 (1986).
1" See Harvey L. Pitt & Dixie L. Johnson, Justice Delayed, Justice Denied:
Observations on the SEC's 'Kern' Decision, N.Y. L.J., July 11, 1991, at 1 (express-
ing the authors' dismay at the Commission's failure to reach the merits of the
case, which had been decided adversely to Mr. Kern). Moreover, the entire four-
year ordeal drew staunch criticism from many in the securities bar who viewed
the SEC's actions as improperly attempting to discipline an attorney who had
made what he believed were good-faith legal judgments. See supra note 172. In-
deed, this may well be quintessential example of "regulation by prosecution." See
ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION (1982), in which former SEC
Commissioner Karmel attributed her numerous dissents from the institution of
enforcement proceedings by the SEC to the SEC's apparent policy of performing
its mandate of regulating the securities industry by enforcement actions instead of
through its rule-making authority: "I felt the SEC's enforcement program was
overly concerned with novelty and morality, and was losing its professionalism. I
believed that the Commission's disclosure policy had become an adjunct of the
SEC's enforcement program and was in need of reform." Id. at 30.
1 For the two alternative arguments, see infra notes 239-47 and accompanying
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cordingly, because the negotiations in Kern were material per
se, they necessarily constituted a per se material change in the
information for purposes of Rule 14d-9(b). Crucial to the viabil-
ity of this argument is the fundamental assumption that the
negotiations required to be disclosed under Item 7 of Schedule
14D-9 are material per se. Support for this assumption can be
found in the releases proposing and adopting Item 7 and in
cases and administrative proceedings where violations of Item
7 have been adjudicated.185
A. Line-Item Disclosure Requirements and Materiality
There are essentially two distinct types of line-item provi-
sions. The first type requires disclosure of specific information
without regard to materiality.'86 Thus, the filing entity would
have no discretion to determine, using the Northway (or Basic)
test, that certain information should be withheld as immateri-
al.187 The second type of line-item requirement explicitly
' See infra notes 193-204 and accompanying text.
IM Consider several provisions contained in Schedule 13D, Item 4:
Describe any plans or proposals which . . relate to or would result in:
(a) The acquisition by any person of additional securities of the is-
suer, or the disposition of securities of the issuer;
(b) An extraordinary corporate transaction, such as a merger, reor-
ganization or liquidation involving the issuer or any of its subsid-
iaries;
(d) Any change in the present board of directors or management
of the issuer, including any plans or proposals to change the num-
ber or term of directors or to fill any existing vacancies on the
board;
(g) Changes in the issuer's charter, by laws or instruments corre-
sponding thereto or other actions which may impede the acquisition
of control of the issuer by any person;
(h) Causing a class of securities of the issuer to be delisted from
a national securities exchange or to cease to be authorized to be
quoted in an inter-dealer quotation system of a registered national
securities association;
(i) A class of equity securities of the issuer becoming eligible for
termination of registration pursuant to Section 12(g)(4) of the Act;
or
(j) Any action similar to any of those enumerated above.
17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (Item 4) (1993).
' Therefore, with respect to Item 4(d) of Schedule 13D, id., the filing entity
could not decide to withhold its plan to remove one member of the issuer's board
19931
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
predicates disclosure of certain information on its materiali-
ty.188 In those provisions, the duty to disclose the information
is premised upon the materiality of the information itself. By
contrast, in the former case, the rule itself creates an affirma-
tive duty of disclosure" 9 and the filing entity's only responsi-
bility is to ensure complete and accurate disclosure in compli-
ance with the line-item provision. 190 But that leaves open an
extremely significant question: is the information required to
be disclosed under line-item provisions that do not premise
of directors as being immaterial to shareholders; the rule specifically requires
disclosure of the plan to change the board of directors regardless of the filing
person's subjective belief as to the information's materiality.
' Consider several additional provisions contained in Schedule 13D, Item 4:
Describe any plans or proposals which . . . relate to or would result in
(c) A sale or transfer of a material amount of assets of the issuer
or any of its subsidiaries; . . .
(e) Any material change in the present capitalization or dividend
policy of the issuer; or
(f) Any other material change in the issuer's business or corpo-
rate structure, including but not limited to, if the issuer is a regis-
tered closed-end investment company, any plans or proposals to
make any changes in its investment policy for which a vote is
required by section 13 of the Investment Company Act of
1940 ....
17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (Item 4) (1993) (emphasis added). See Goelzer, supra note
11, at 976 n.5 ("In some cases, line-item requirements are qualified by a materiali-
ty standard-responsive information need only be disclosed if material. In other
cases, responsive information must be disclosed regardless of materiality."); City
Capital Assoc. v. Interco, Inc., 860 F.2d 60 (3d Cir. 1988) (discussing "materiality"
requirement in Schedule 14D-1, Item 9); Prudent Real Estate Trust v. Johacamp
Realty, 599 F.2d 1140, 1146 (2d Cir. 1979) (same); Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp.,
527 F. Supp. 86, 99-100 (E.D.N.Y.) (discussing "materiality" requirement in Sched-
ule 14D-1, Item 10(c)), affid, 665 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1981).
19 See Brown, supra note 11, at 101-02:
Unlike the antifraud provisions, the line item [provisions] . . . are intend-
ed to provide a certain degree of informational parity among investors.
These requirements essentially insure that all investors have certain
specified information deemed necessary for informed decisionmaking, such
as whether to buy or sell securities, execute a proxy, or tender in re-
sponse to a tender offer.
Id. Professor Brown's observation is both interesting and confusing; on the one
hand, he acknowledges that many line-item provisions require certain information
"deemed necessary for informed decisionmaking," id., which suggests that he be-
lieves (as this Comment suggests) that they call for material information. On the
other hand, though-and in the very same article-he questions whether the infor-
mation required by the line-item provisions to which he refers would be material
under the Northway standard. See id. at 101 n.34; see also infra note 191.
"o See Goldstein et al., supra note 11, at 142.
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disclosure on materiality (the first type of line-item provision
referred to above), in fact, material? This is an important ques-
tion, because its answer could very well be determinative of
the materiality issue in SEC enforcement proceedings and in
civil suits for damages in which omissions from the line-item
provisions are alleged and materiality is a crucial element.
There are several ways of approaching this issue. The
first-and most appropriate-method of viewing the weight to be
accorded to line-item provisions that do not predicate disclo-
sure on materiality is that the information required to be dis-
closed is material per se. 9' According to this view, the SEC
11 Some commentators have suggested that information required to be disclosed
under the SEC's line-item provisions is always material. See Victor Brudney, A
Note on Materiality and Soft Information under the Federal Securities Laws, 75
VA. L. REV. 723, 727 (1989) ("The particular items of information mandated to be
disclosed in the schedules . . . under sections 12, 13 and 14 of the 1934 Act are
presumably automatically deemed to be 'material.'). Professor Brown, however,
asserts that although not all information required to be disclosed under the line-
item provisions would necessarily meet the Northway materiality standard, the
line-items nevertheless create an expectation among shareholders that certain in-
formation will be provided. Thus, he believes, its omission would be material.
Brown, supra note 11, at 101 n.34; see also supra note 13. This suggestion, howev-
er, seems to confuse materiality with the duty to disclose. Materiality deals only
with what reasonable shareholders would consider important in deciding what to
do with their shares. Northway makes this clear. See supra notes 30-42 and ac-
companying text. If certain line-items provide information that, as Professor Brown
suggests, is immaterial under the Northway standard, then merely creating an
expectation among shareholders that they will be provided with immaterial infor-
mation ought not, in and of itself, to make that information material. On the
other hand, if the importance of the information in and of itself to an informed
investment decision creates an expectation of receiving information specifically
required by a line-item provision, then the information is implicitly material.
Therefore, although requiring disclosure of immaterial information may be helpful
to shareholders, that duty to disclose does not-and cannot-mandate a finding of
materiality.
Steinberg and Goldman argue that "materiality in the context of an affirma-
tive duty to disclose largely should be measured by the concept of ripeness. Ripe-
ness, in turn, incorporates both the significance of the information and its reliabili-
ty." Steinberg & Goldman, supra note 53, at 952 n.141. This suggestion is also
unworkable because an affirmative duty of disclosure, such as a line-item provi-
sion, leaves no discretion to assess "ripeness." What Steinberg and Goldman sug-
gest is simply that line-item requirements should not require disclosure of informa-
tion that is not material. That argument is better suited toward a petition direct-
ed at the SEC to change its rules. But their argument should not leave filing
entities free to incorporate selectively or omit information simply because they
have a subjective belief that the information is insufficiently significant to disclose
to the market.
Finally, other commentators have recognized that line-items create affirmative
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employed its expertise in promulgating specific line-item re-
quirements, concluding that certain information is so signifi-
cant to the reasonable shareholder that its disclosure is re-
quired in order to insure an informed investment decision. Ac-
cordingly, that information should be viewed as per se materi-
al.1
92
Perhaps the clearest example of a line-item provision that
requires the disclosure of information that is material per se is
Item 7 of Schedule 14D-9 (the line-item at issue in the Kern
case).' 93 Item 7 requires disclosure of "certain negotiations
and transactions by the subject company."'94 Item 7(a) re-
quires disclosure of "any negotiation.., being undertaken
or... underway... in response to the tender offer" that
would lead to one of four corporate events1 95 similar to those
disclosure duties while taking no position on whether or not the information re-
quired to be disclosed is material. See, e.g., Bruce A. Hiler, The SEC and the
Courts' Approach to Disclosure of Earnings Projections, Asset Appraisals, and Other
Soft Information: Old Problems, Changing Views, 46 MD. L. REV. 1114, 1170-71
(1987) ("Certain ... rules and regulations promulgated by the SEC require specif-
ic disclosures in various situations .... This information must be disclosed re-
gardless of whether it otherwise would be deemed material.") (footnotes omitted).
'" This Comment does not argue that all line-item disclosure requirements in
all SEC disclosure schedules require information that is per se material. This Com-
ment does argue, however, that many of the line-item provisions promulgated
under the Williams Act-especially those requiring disclosure of merger negotia-
tions during the pendency of a tender offer-require the disclosure of information
that is per se material. A securities practitioner would know that a particular line-
item does or does not call for information that is per se material by scrutinizing
the line-item provision, any instruction thereto and by reading the SEC's releases
proposing and adopting that line-item. Of course, this analysis is limited to those
instances in which the practitioner must determine whether a "material change in
the information" has occurred after the initial Schedule is filed. See, e.g., infra
notes 235-48 and accompanying text.
193 Cf Goelzer, supra note 11, at 981-82 ("The obligation to disclose preliminary
merger negotiations pursuant to Item 7(a) is absolute in the sense that no sepa-
rate duty to disclose is necessary .... Materiality is not an issue."). Mr.
Goelzer's assertion that "materiality is not an issue" for purposes of Item 7 disclo-
sure is indeed true. Both he and Professor Brown, supra note 11, however, failed
to take the argument one step further to determine whether information required
under Item 7 is always material. This issue represents a gap in the current litera-
ture, see supra note 191 and accompanying text, and its resolution is one of the
fundamental purposes of this Comment.
'" 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (Item 7) (1993).
... Id. Item 7(a) of Schedule 14D-9 provides in relevant part:
[SItate whether or not any negotiation is being undertaken or is under-
way by the subject company in response to the tender offer which relates
to or would result in:
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included in Item 3(b) of Schedule 14D-1 9' and Item 4(b) of
Schedule 13D. 197
In determining whether Item 7(a)(1) requires disclosure of
negotiations that, under accepted tests of materiality, are al-
ways material, the SEC's release proposing Item 7 is instruc-
tive: "Efforts by the subject company such as those described in
proposed Item 7 can have a determinative effect on the out-
come of a tender offer and therefore are material to a security
holder who is faced with making an investment deci-
sion ..... '98 Moreover, the SEC's release adopting Item 7 in-
to its current form is conclusive: "The major developments re-
ferred to in Item 7 can be one of the most material items of
information received by security holders."'99 Because of these
statements, an extremely important question arises as to the
correct definition of the word "material" as used in the SEC's
releases proposing and adopting Item 7. In Rule 12b-2,"0 the
SEC essentially codified Northway's materiality standard:
[the term "material," when used to qualify a requirement for the
furnishing of information as to any subject, limits the information
(1) An extraordinary transaction such as a merger or reorganiza-
tion, involving the subject company or any subsidiary of the subject
company;
(2) A purchase, sale or transfer of a material amount of assets by
the subject company or any subsidiary of the subject company;
(3) A tender offer for or other acquisition of securities by or of
the subject company; or
(4) Any material change in the present capitalization or dividend
policy of the subject company.
Instruction:
If no agreement in principle has yet been reached, the possible
terms of any transaction or the parties thereto need not be dis-
closed if in the opinion of the Board of Directors of the subject
company such disclosure would jeopardize continuation of such
negotiations. In such event, disclosure that negotiations are being
undertaken or are underway and are in the preliminary stages will
be sufficient.
Id. (emphasis added).
" See infra note 203.
1. See supra note 186.
"' Proposed Tender Offer Rules and Schedule, Exchange Act Release No.
15,548, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,935, at 81,236 n.106
(June 30, 1979) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Proposed Rules].
" Tender Offers, Exchange Act Release No. 16,384, [1979-80 Transfer Binder]
Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,373, at 82,594 (Nov. 29, 1979) (emphasis added).
" 17 C.F.R. §,240.12b-2 (1993).
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required to those matters to which there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable investor would attach importance in determining
whether to buy or sell the securities registered."1
Because the SEC requires filing entities to apply Northway to
the term "material" when it appears in the SEC's rules and
disclosure schedules, it is logical to conclude that the SEC's
definitive statement that Item 7 negotiations are material was
informed by the Northway definition. 2 Item 7, therefore,
provides the clearest example of a line-item provision that re-
quires the disclosure of information that, under Northway, is
always material;. 3 according to the SEC's expert judgment,
201 Id. (emphasis added).
202 This assertion, however, appears to highlight a potential conflict between the
Supreme Court's holding in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), and the
SEC's classification of preliminary merger negotiations occurring in response to a
tender offer as material. Although the Basic court explicitly adopted Northway's
materiality standard in the Rule 10b-5 context, see supra notes 66-67 and accom-
panying text, it also explicitly adopted TGS's fact-specific probability/magnitude
test for contingent events such as preliminary merger negotiations. See supra note
69 and accompanying text. At first glance, the Basic court's holding-that the as-
sessment of whether or not negotiations are material requires a case-by-case as-
sessment-appears to reject the SEC's conclusion that all preliminary merger nego-
tiations conducted by a target company during a tender offer are material. Never-
theless, Basic in no way overrules or undermines the SEC's conclusion; Basic is a
Rule 10b-5 case and its applicability should be limited to that context. Similarly,
the SEC's conclusion that all preliminary merger negotiations occurring in response
to a tender offer are per se material is naturally entitled to great weight and
should not be disturbed "unless . . . arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to
the statute." United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 556 (2d Cir. 1991) (en
bane), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992) (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)); see also Batteron
v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425-26 (1977); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Gover-
nors, 468 U.S. 137, 143 (1984). No argument could be advanced that the SEC
exceeded its statutory mandate in classifying the negotiations referred to in Item 7
as material. Section 14(d)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4) (1988), the enabling statute for
Rule 14d-9 and Schedule 14D-9, provides "[alny solicitation or recommendation to
the holders of ... a security to accept or reject a tender ... shall be made in
accordance with such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe."
This is an extremely broad grant of authority, giving the SEC both the power to
define materiality as it sees fit and to classify whole groups of information as per
se material. Cf Chestman, 947 F.2d at 558 (SEC has rulemaking authority to
define certain conduct as fraudulent and proscribe it as such even though conduct
does not amount to common-law fraud).
' Item 3(b) of Schedule 14D-1, which requires disclosure of past contracts,
transactions or negotiations with the target company concerning "[a] merger, con-
solidation or acquisition; a tender offer or other acquisition of securities; an elec-
tion of directors; or a sale or other transfer of a material amount of assets," 17
C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (Item 3(b)) (1993), provides another example of information
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the negotiations referred to in Item 7 are material per se.2"
4
that the SEC has determined is per se material. In promulgating Item 3(b), the
SEC recognized past dealings with the target company, in the context of a tender
offer, to be material information:
Item 3 recognized that a tender offer may not be an isolated event in
the corporate histories of the bidder and the subject company. Disclosure
concerning certain events which occurred, either directly or indirectly,
between these parties in the recent past is material to an investment
decision by a security holder in the context of a tender offer.
Filing and Disclosure Requirements Relating to Tender Offer, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 13,787, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,256, at
88,376-77 (July 21, 1977) (emphasis added).
In the only enforcement proceeding to deal with an alleged violation of Item
3(b), In re RIT Acquisition Corp. and Robert I. Toussie Ltd. Partnership, Exchange
Act Release No. 30,732, 1992 SEC LEXIS 1201 (May 22, 1992), the SEC found that
the bidder had failed to disclose that it had commenced what amounted to negoti-
ations with the target company, the Lionel Corporation, subsequent to the filing of
its Schedule 14D-1, in violation of Rule 14d-6. Id. at *6-9. Rule 14d-6, like Rule
14d-9(b), requires prompt disclosure of any material change in the information set
forth in the original schedule. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-6 (1993). Significantly the SEC
made no finding as to materiality for purposes of a "material change in the infor-
mation." The SEC's conclusion that the onset of negotiations required an amend-
ment without any reference to Basic or Northway implicitly recognized that the
omitted information was material per se.
2:' "Once an offer has been made, shareholders and the markets ought to know
whether the subject company's management is negotiating with another party. SEC
schedule 14D-9, Item 7 recognizes this point . . . . " Steinberg & Goldman, supra
note 53, at 926 n.18; see also Brown, supra note 11, at 106 ("The commencement
of negotiations constitutes a material development . . . ."); see also Gailey, supra
note 53, at 1211 ("In Item 7, the target must disclose certain material negotiations
and actions that are undertaken in response to [a tender] offer."); H. Frasier Ives,
Note, Disclosing the White Knight-When Does the Duty Arise?, 42 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1045, 1066-67 (1985) ("A target corporation clearly must disclose its white
knight merger activities when subject to the formal disclosure requirements of the
federal securities laws."). In arguing that shareholders ought to know that the
target company is engaging in preliminary negotiations referred to in Item 7,
these commentators appear to have assumed that Item 7 information is per se
material. Although, they have not attempted to justify their position, logically they
would not have argued so forcefully in favor of disclosure if such information were
not material.
Significantly, before Schedule 14D-9 was promulgated in 1979, its predecessor,
Schedule 14D, did not require disclosure of preliminary merger negotiations. Thus,
the target management's only disclosure obligation was under section 14(e), 15
U.S.C. § 78n(3) (1988). One commentator called for more extensive disclosure by
target management, arguing that the target should be required to disclose its
position on the offer, and its material activities with respect thereto. Peter C.
Hein, Note, A Proposal for Affirmative Disclosure by Target Management During
Tender Offers, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 190, 200-207 (1975).
This Comment argues that Item 7 information is material because the SEC
concluded that, under Northway, such information is always material, no matter
how tentative or inchoate the negotiations may be. But, even if one refuses to ac-
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Despite the logic of this argument, few other courts have
held that information specifically required to be disclosed un-
der the SEC's line-item provisions is per se material. In Otis
Elevator Co. v. United Technologies Corp.,2°5 for instance, the
district court held that "[iut is agreed by both sides and clear to
the court that a merger plan, if present, is per se material
under [Schedule 13D, Item 4 of] the Williams Act.""6 But on-
cept at face value that Item 7(aX) negotiations are material per se simply be-
cause the SEC says that they are, it simply cannot be disputed that during a
tender offer there exists a substantial likelihood that reasonable shareholders
would consider important a target company's negotiations with either the hostile
bidder or a white knight concerning a merger or a recapitalization in deciding
what to do with their shares. See TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448
(1976). Indeed, evidence from finance journals detailing the effects of both success-
ful and unsuccessful tender offers on target companies' share prices persuasively
reveals that the target's share price earns extremely abnormal, positive returns
merely when an offer is announced. Without a doubt, a significant increase (or
decrease) in a target company's share price before and immediately following the
announcement of an offer is strong evidence of the materiality of negotiations that
could lead to a completed transaction. See Koenig, supra note 29, at 1028, 1052
nn. 38 & 136.
405 F. Supp. 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Id. at 969. Significantly, the court accepted the per se argument for merger
plans under the previous version of Item 4, which did not provide a specific list of
transactions for which existence of plans must be disclosed, and which required
disclosure of any plans or proposals only if the purpose of the purchase was to
acquire control of the issuer. For the current version of Schedule 13D, Item 4, see
supra notes 186 & 188.
When Item 4 was originally promulgated, it essentially tracked the language
of section 13(d)(1)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(C) (1988). In 1978, Item 4 was sub-
stantially modified into its current form. In adopting the modification, the SEC
stated:
Unlike old Item 4, new Item 4 requires disclosure of plans in the nature
of those described in the Item regardless of whether one of the purposes
of the purchase is to acquire control of the issuer .... In this regard,
plans or proposals which result in or relate to extraordinary corporate
transactions have been made a separate item of disclosure, as in Sched-
ule 14D-1. This is to obviate the possible limitation on disclosure ... as
a result of the placement in the proposal of the term "extraordinary cor-
porate transactions" prior to the list of enumerated disclosures. The Item
has also been expanded to require disclosure about types of plans of the
purchaser not specifically required by old Item 4 ....
Filing and Disclosure Requirements Relating to Beneficial Ownership, Exchange
Act Release No. 14,692, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 81,571,
at 80,314 (Apr. 21, 1978) (emphasis added). While the SEC did not expressly state
that the information required in Item 4 was material, the fact that Congress, in
section 13(dXl)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(dXl)(C) (1988), originally required disclosure of
the purchaser's plans and proposals is indicative of the importance of that infor-
mation to shareholders. Moreover, that the SEC expanded the disclosure provisions
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ly a few other courts have been willing to go so far.2" ' On the
contrary, most courts that find omissions of information specif-
ically required to be disclosed proceed to evaluate the material-
ity of such information on a case-by-case basis."' In many
to require disclosure of plans or proposals relating to one of several significant
corporate transactions irrespective of the purpose of the transaction is further evi-
dence that the Item requires disclosure of material information. Thus, the court's
decision in Otis Elevator was correct.
20 See, e.g., Pavlidis v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 737 F.2d
1227, 1238 (1st Cir. 1984) ("[Ilt might be argued that the Commission's guidelines
create a per se rule that the nondisclosure of compensating balances in excess of
15% of liquid assets constitutes a material omission."); Maldonado v. Flynn, 597
F.2d 789, 796-97 (2d Cir. 1979) (allegations of self-dealing not reported under
applicable line-item provisions of Schedule 14A are material per se); Kaufman v.
Cooper Cos., 719 F. Supp. 174, 179-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (omission from line-item
provision requiring disclosure of updated financial information constitutes a per se
violation of section 14(a)); SEC v. World-Wide Coin Inv. Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724,
756 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (terms of agreement between former controlling shareholder
and person to whom majority ownership was transferred "[wiere clearly materi-
al . . . since such disclosure was specifically required by items 6 and 7 of Sched-
ule 13D and by items 7 and 9 of Schedule 14D-1"); Martin Marietta Corp. v.
Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 632 (D. Md. 1982) (holding that financial condi-
tion of tender offeror is assumed material; focus is on adequacy of disclosure);
Lewis v. Dansker, 357 F. Supp. 636, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (omission of information
required by Item 11(a) of Schedule 14A is per se violation of Rule 14a-3 and sec-
tion 14(a)); see also In re Craftmatic Sec. Litig., 890 F.2d 628, 641 n.17 (3d Cir.
1989) ("Disclosures mandated by law are presumably material.") (citation omitted).
Cf. USG Corp. v. Wagner & Brown, 689 F. Supp. 1483, 1489 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
("Section 13(d) requires a potential bidder only to disclose material information.").
The court in USG was clearly mistaken because it is not unreasonable to assume
that Congress and the SEC may require filing entities to disclose information that
is not material under Northway (or Basic).
"0 For instance, in Camelot Indus. Corp. v. Vista Resources, Inc., 535 F. Supp.
1174 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), the District Court for the Southern District of New York
looked to Northway before holding that Vista's failure to disclose that it had
reached a voting agreement with one of Canielot's largest
shareholders-information specifically required to be disclosed under Item 6 of
Schedule 13D-was a material omission. The court concluded that "[there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder in deciding whether or not to
tender would consider significant the knowledge that Heine, the largest single
shareholder, and Vista ... had agreed to vote against the proposals." Id. at 1180.
It would seem self-evident that the SEC specifically required disclosure of such
contracts because they are without question material to shareholders. See, e.g.,
Finnegan v. Campeau Corp., 915 F.2d 824, 830 (2d Cir. 1990) (SEC justified in
requiring disclosure under Schedule 14D-1, Item 7 (same as Schedule 13D, Item 6)
agreement among two rival bidders with respect to target), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
1624 (1991).
Courts have applied similar reasoning to disputes involving Schedule 13D,
Item 3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1993) (and Schedule 14D-1, Item 4) which re-
quires filing parties to disclose the source of funds used to finance stock purchas-
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cases, this separate materiality analysis of information that
appears to be per se material effectively second-guesses the
SEC's rule-making authority.
One way that some courts in civil suits have avoided this
sort of second-guessing is to find that the SEC's line-item pro-
visions establish a rebuttable presumption of materiality. Un-
der this view, courts, as a matter of administrative law, would
be obligated to presume that information that the SEC re-
quires be disclosed is in fact material unless the defendant can
demonstrate that the particular information at issue is imma-
terial."9 While several courts have implicitly recognized such
a rule, the Sixth Circuit, in Howing Co. v. Nationwide
es. Compare A. P. Green Indus. v. East Rock Partners, 726 F. Supp. 757, 761
(E.D. Mo. 1989) (focusing on materiality of alleged omission from Schedule 13D,
Item 4, instead of on compliance or non-compliance) with IU Int'l v. NX Acquisi-
tion Corp., 840 F.2d 220, 223 ("[tlhe existence of a financing contingency is a
material term of an offer and the fact of contingency must be stated, how the
financing will ultimately occur is not essential to an offer."), affd on reconsidera-
tion, 840 F.2d 229 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (per curiam), Koppers Co. v. American
Express Co., 689 F. Supp. 1371, 1393 (W.D. Pa. 1988) ("SEC regulations recognize
that the nature and terms of financing arrangements are highly material to the
decisions of investors.") and Management Assistance, Inc. v. Edelman, 584 F.
Supp. 1021, 1030-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that Schedule 13D, Item 4, does not
require corporate borrowings used to conduct ordinary business be disclosed; loan
was not used to finance purchases of issuer's stock).
Finally, courts have engaged in a separate materiality analysis in cases in-
volving violations of certain line-item provisions under the proxy rules that appear
to call for information that is per se material. See Gladwin v. Medfield Corp., 540
F.2d 1266, 1270 (5th Cir. 1976) ("[Item 4(b) of Schedule 14A] requires a list of the
purchases and sales of Medfield stock made within the past two years .... The
purchases were not disclosed in Medfield's proxy material . . . . While the district
court made no finding on materiality[,] we think that there was a substantial
likelihood that knowledge of these purchases 'would have assumed actual signifi-
cance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder."') (citation omitted); Lewis
v. Dansker, 357 F. Supp. 636, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("The question, therefore, nar-
rows to whether the admitted omission to state the market price [as required by
Schedule 14A, Item 11(a)] was material as to the approval of stock sale.").
" Where an SEC release adopting a line-item provision specifically states that
the information is material (as in the case with Item 7), that determination should
be given preclusive effect in subsequent civil litigation. See generally United States
v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 718-19 (1975) (as agency charged
with oversight of the securities markets, SEC's judgment on matters within its
expertise should be accorded great deference). Thus, for instance, a 10b-5 defen-
dant who is charged with failing to disclose negotiations specifically required by
Schedule 14D-9, Item 7, would have to demonstrate that the SEC's determination
that such information is always material is arbitrary and capricious. See generally




Corp.,210 did so explicitly.
In Howing, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's
grant of summary judgment21' to the defendant on the issue
of materiality, holding that the factors upon which the compa-
ny based its belief as to the fairness of the going private trans-
action,212 and which were specifically required to be disclosed
210 927 F.2d 263 (6th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 39 (1991), on
remand, 972 F.2d 700 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1645 (1993).
211 The Howing case is a veritable procedural monster. In 1985, the district
court dismissed Howing's complaint finding no Schedule 13E-3 violations. Howing
Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 625 F. Supp. 146 (S.D. Ohio 1985). The Sixth Circuit
reversed, finding that Nationwide had violated the disclosure provisions of Sched-
ule 13E-3 and remanded to the district court to determine whether the omissions
were material. Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 826 F.2d 1470 (6th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988). On remand, the district court granted summary
judgment to the defendant, Nationwide, concluding that under the Northway stan-
dard the omissions were immaterial as a matter of law. Howing Co. v. Nationwide
Corp., [1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,858 (S.D. Ohio Nov.
16, 1989). The Sixth Circuit again reversed, holding that the omissions were pre-
sumptively material. Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 927 F.2d 263 (6th Cir.
1991). The Supreme Court, in light of its decision in Virginia Bankshares v.
Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749 (1991), vacated on grounds pertaining to causation and
to Howing's state law claims. Nationwide Corp. v. Howing, 112 S. Ct. 39 (1991).
On remand, the Sixth Circuit held that the Supreme Court's decision in Virginia
Bankshares did not affect its Schedule 13E-3 materiality holding and, once again,
remanded the case to the district court. Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 972 F.2d
700 (6th Cir. 1992). As of this writing, the case was pending in the district court.
212 Item 8 of Schedule 13E-3 (Fairness of the Transaction) provides:
(a) State whether the issuer or affiliate filing this schedule reason-
ably believes that the Rule 13e-3 transaction is fair or unfair to unaffiHi-
ated security holders ....
b) Discuss in reasonable detail the material factors upon which the
belief stated in Item 8(a) is based and, to the extent practicable, the
weight assigned to each such factor. Such discussion should include an
analysis of the extent, if any, to which such belief is based on the factors
set forth in instruction (1) to paragraph (b) of this Item ....
Instructions. (1) the factors which are important in determining the
fairness of a transaction to unaffiliated security holders and the weight,
if any, which should be given to them in a particular context will vary.
Normally such factors will include, among others .... whether the con-
sideration offered to unaffiliated security holders constitutes fair value in
relation to
(i) Current market prices
(ii) Historical market prices
(iii) Net book value
(iv) Going concern value
(v) Liquidation value ....
(2) Conclusory statements, such as "The Rule 13e-3 transaction is
fair to unaffiliated security holders in relation to net book value, going
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under Item 8(b) of Schedule 13E-3,213 were presumptively
material:
Although we agree with the District Court that the general
[Northway] standard of materiality is applicable to transactions
governed by Rule 13e-3, the clear and specific language of the in-
structions to Item 8 creates in effect a presumption that discussion
of book, going concern and liquidation value in the proxy statement
would be material to a reasonable shareholder. The presumed
fact-that the investor would likely find disclosure of such informa-
tion significant-follows from Item 8's insistence that the informa-
tion be stated.
The likelihood that the factors the SEC enumerated in
Item 8(b) will be material is sufficiently strong that omission of such
factors without explanation of the reason for the omission will result
in a rebuttable presumption of their materiality. "
Although the Howing court is the only one to create affirma-
tively a rebuttable presumption for materiality for information
concern value and future prospects of the issuer" will not be considered
sufficient disclosure in response to Item 8(b).
17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (Item 8) (1993) (first emphasis added).
213 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100 (1993).
214 Howing, 927 F.2d at 265-66. The district court's opinion, holding that the
factors listed in Item 8(b) were immaterial as a matter of law because the differ-
ent values were all less than the price being offered to shareholders and thus,
would be unimportant to their decision, was properly rejected by the Sixth Circuit.
In In re Meyers Parking System, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 26,069, [1988-89
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,333 (Sept. 12, 1988), the SEC, in a
consent decree, emphasized the importance of full Item 8 disclosure in a 13e-3
transaction. In Meyers the company had simply provided a laundry list of factors
considered without discussing their weight or importance:
The book value of the stock ... is only $3.77 per share, as compared
with the an offering price in the merger transaction of $29.50 per share.
An adequate response to Item 8(b) with respect to book value would
include discussion of the reasons and extent to which book value is or is
not an accurate reflection of the Company's value and therefore was
accepted or rejected as a criterion for judging the fairness of the transac-
tion.
Id. at 89,498; accord Plaza Sec. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 643 F. Supp. 1535 (E.D.
Mich. 1986). But see Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (con-
cluding that 13e-3 proxy statement must simply provide factors fairness opinion
relied upon; shareholders will determine for themselves what weight to accord
those factors), affd, 772 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 903
(1986); but cf., Gans v. Filmways, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 1116 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (pre-
Schedule 13D-3 case holding that book value would be immaterial as a matter of
law to reasonable shareholder's decision in a freeze-out merger), affd, 595 F.2d
1212 (3rd Cir. 1979).
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required by a line-item provision,215 the Third Circuit noted
in In re Craftmatic Securities Litigation v. Kraftsow21 s that
"[dlisclosures mandated by law are presumably material.""7
Simply put, the line-item provisions provide a framework so
that the minimum amount of material information reaches
shareholders.218
Finally, some courts have held that line-item provisions
simply constitute evidence that the information required to be
disclosed under them is material. Recently, in United States v.
Bilzerian,219 the Second Circuit considered a criminal prose-
cution for insider trading premised, in part, upon violations of
Schedule 13D's line-item requirements. It rejected the proposi-
2' It must be noted that unlike Item 7 of Schedule 14D-9 (the provision at
issue in Kern), Item 8(b) of Schedule 13E-3 explicitly lists various material factors
on which the fairness valuation might be based. Indeed, that is the proper justifi-
cation for imposing a rebuttable presumption of materiality. The Howing court's
further rationale-that the presumption of materiality flows from Item 8s insis-
tence that the information be disclosed-is wide of the mark. Mandating that cer-
tain information be disclosed cannot, in and of itself, render that information ma-
terial. See supra notes 13 & 191.
216 890 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1989).
2" Id. at 641 n.17 (citation omitted). For another example of a court presuming
that information specifically required to be disclosed under the SEC's line-item
provisions is material, see, e.g., Sea Containers, Ltd. v. Stena AB, 741 F. Supp.
236 (D.D.C. 1989) (criminal convictions and civil or administrative adjudications
pertaining to securities laws violations occurring within five years of bid (required
under Items 2(e) and (f) of Schedule 14D-1) are presumptively material). But see
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. Hi-Shear Indus., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1122, 1127-28
(E.D.N.Y. 1980) (omission from Item 2(f) of Schedule 14D-1 of a five-year old judg-
ment that enjoined a bidder from future violations of securities laws was imma-
terial as a matter of law). Raybestos-Manhattan provides a classic example of a
court second-guessing the SEC's rule-making authority. By purporting to apply
Northway's materiality standard, the court's personal view that the information
simply could not have been important to shareholders eviscerated the clear and
specific requirements of Schedule 14D-1. This sort of paternalistic, subjective as-
sessment was roundly criticized by the Supreme Court in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,
485 U.S. 224, 234 (1988) ("Disclosure, and not paternalistic withholding of accurate
information, is the policy chosen and expressed by Congress.").
21 See Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 796 n.9 (2d Cir. 1979) (Schedule 14A
sets out minimum disclosure standards. Compliance with this Schedule does not
necessarily guarantee that a proxy statement satisfies Rule 14a-9.") (citations omit-
ted); see also United States v. Matthews, 787 F.2d 38, 47-49 (2d Cir. 1986) (con-
cluding that failure to admit guilt of allegations being investigated by a grand
jury in proxy statement is not a material omission and insufficient to support
criminal liability because SEC rules do not require such information to be dis-
closed); Bertoglio v. Texas Int'l. Co., 488 F. Supp. 630, 647 (D. Del. 1980) (Sched-
ule 14A sets only minimum disclosure standards).
2 19 926 F.2d 1285 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 63 (1991).
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tion that certain information was material per se simply be-
cause section 13(d) calls for its disclosure:
We decline to hold that the information required to be disclosed in
[Schedule] 13D is material per se for purposes of § 10(b) simply
because such disclosure is required under the securities laws. But
the fact that [such] information is required to be revealed under
section 13(d) is evidence of its materiality.2
0
Even though these approaches may better respect the
SEC's expertise than a case-by-case approach, they neverthe-
less would operate in an enforcement proceeding to second-
guess the SEC's rule-making authority. In an SEC enforcement
proceeding such as Kern, the omission from a disclosure state-
ment of information specifically required by line-item provi-
sions such as Item 7 of Schedule 14D-9-information which the
Id. at 1298 (citation omitted). While the court's reluctance to accept a "per se
materiality" argument in a criminal case is quite understandable, its reliance on
SEC v. Levy, 706 F. Supp. 61 (D.D.C. 1989), however, highlights the circuitous
nature of the materiality analysis in many courts and the need for guidance on
the issue of materiality and line-item disclosure provisions. In Levy the SEC sued
for an injunction claiming that the defendant had violated the insider trading
provisions of Rule 10b-5 by failing to disclose that its stock purchases were funded
by borrowed money, thereby violating the reporting requirements of Schedule 13D,
Item 3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (Item 3) (1993) (Source and Amount of Funds).
The district court, in granting the SEC's motion for summary judgment, held that
the defendant's failure to disclose that his stock purchases were funded by bor-
rowed money-information specifically required to be disclosed under section 13(d)
and in Schedule 13D-was a material omission under Northway. Levy, 706 F.
Supp. at 72. The court reasoned "the fact that defendant purchased his IDI stock
largely from borrowed funds rather than from personal funds would have assumed
actual significance in the deliberations of a reasonable shareholder." Id. at 72. This
reasoning is pervasively circular. In requiring that an acquiror of more than five
percent of an issuer's shares disclose the source and amount of funds used to
purchase the shares and any loan agreements with respect thereto, Congress and
the SEC implicitly had already determined under the Northway test that such
information is material to the issuer's shareholders. See Koppers Co., Inc. v. Amer-
ican Express Co., 689 F. Supp. 1371, 1393 (W.D. Pa. 1988) ("SEC regulations
recognize that the nature and terms of financing arrangements are highly material
to the decisions of investors."); see also Beneficial Ownership, supra note 207, at
80,314 ("New Item 3, concerning disclosure of the source of funds used or to be
used in making the acquisitions, is similar to old item 3. The reference of consid-
eration used or 'to be used' is added to assure that financing arrangements are
disclosed."). That the SEC broadened the requirements of Item 3 disclosure is
evidence of its importance to shareholders. Therefore, the Levy court's holding that
under Northway the information would have assumed actual significance in
shareholders' deliberations is redundant: in essence, that is the very reason that




SEC itself considers material-must necessarily constitute a
material omission. Since the SEC is best suited to interpret
the rules it promulgates, such a finding would be justified and
should be encouraged.
B. Judge Blair's Analysis under Basic of the Negotiations
Required to be Disclosed Under Item 7(a)(1) was Improper
The AJ's materiality analysis, under Basic, of the negoti-
ations that Mr. Kern declined to disclose was clearly improper
for three separate and distinct reasons. Before setting forth
those arguments, though, the threshold issue of whether or not
Allied and DeBartolo were engaged in "negotiations" within
the meaning of Schedule 14D-9, Item 7(a)(1), must be ad-
dressed.
1. The Revlon Decision: What Constitutes "Negotiations"
Item 7's requirement that the existence of negotiations be
disclosed gives rise to an important question: what constitutes
a "negotiation" within the meaning of Item 7?221 In In re
Revlon, Inc,222 the SEC considered this questions and wheth-
er the commencement of negotiations represents a material
change in the information if the target's original Item 7 disclo-
" Indeed, one might argue that the answer to this question effectively collaps-
es the "materiality per se" issue on which this Comment extensively focuses, for if
no "negotiation" is under way within the meaning of Item 7(a), then any informa-
tion concerning mere contacts or preliminary "discussions" between the target and
potentially interested third parties is per se immaterial. Thus, the argument would
conclude, the focus is not on materiality but on compliance; if "negotiations" are
underway, then they must be disclosed regardless of materiality. The "materiality
per se" argument does not collapse, however. On the contrary, it is reinforced: by
distinguishing between negotiations and preliminary contacts, the SEC has recog-
nized that past a certain level, target company activity in response to a tender
offer is significant enough to require its disclosure. Thus, that the focus under
Item 7 shifts to what constitutes a negotiation simply confirms that negotiations
in general are material per se. Asking "what constitutes 'negotiations" is separate
and distinct from asking, "are the negotiations material," because the SEC has
recognized that, in the context of a tender offer, all "negotiations" are material,
whether they have recently commenced or are nearing an agreement in principle.
' Exchange Act Release No. 23,320, [1986-87 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 84,006 (June 16, 1986). Revlon entered into a consent decree with
the SEC, neither admitting nor denying wrongdoing, but agreeing to comply with
Rule 14d-9(b). Id. at 88,147.
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sure did not indicate that negotiations were underway."
Revlon was the subject of a hostile tender offer by Pantry
Pride. Revlon opposed the offer, and in its September 24, 1985
Schedule 14D-9, stated in Item 7 that it "may undertake nego-
tiations which relate to or could result in" one of the corporate
events listed in Item 7(a). 4 Eight days later Revlon publicly
announced that it was considering a number of alternatives to
the Pantry Pride offer, including a leveraged buy-out. The next
day, Revlon amended its Schedule 14D-9, Item 7, disclosing a
merger agreement with leveraged buy-out specialists
Forstmann Little & Co. and disclosing the sale of Revlon's
domestic beauty group to Adler & Shaykin.2 5 After increas-
ing its offer and after a crucial court decision, Pantry Pride
eventually gained control of Revlon.
The SEC brought an enforcement proceeding under section
15(c)(4) of the 1934 Act,22 alleging that Revlon had failed to
amend promptly its Schedule 14D-9 to reveal that negotiations
had commenced that could lead to a merger. The commence-
ment of negotiations, thus, was a material change in the infor-
mation, triggering the duty to amend promptly.2 The SEC
reiterated that the information in Item 7 can be one of the
most material items of information received by securityholders,
and found that Revlon's Item 7 disclosure that it "may" under-
take negotiations implied that no negotiations were under-
way."s The SEC further noted: "The term "negotiations"
should not be interpreted in a technical and restrictive man-
ner. As used in Item 7(a), the term "negotiations" includes not
only final price bargaining, but also applies to substantive
discussions between the parties or their legal and financial
advisers concerning a possible transaction."2 9 The SEC con-
cluded that the discussions23 between the parties had rip-
223 Id. at 88,142.
' Id. at 88,143 (emphasis added). Revlon had not included in its Item 7 a
response that "currently ... no negotiations are underway," a phrase that it had
included in a Schedule 14D-9 filed in connection with a prior tender offer, which
Pantry Pride ultimately withdrew. Id.
225 Id. at 88,145.
22 See supra note 17.
22 Revlon, at 88,146.
2Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
For further proof that the SEC considers the difference between "negotia-
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ened into negotiations on September 26, 1985, two days after
Revlon had filed its initial Schedule 14D-9, but six days before
it had disclosed that it was considering a leveraged buy-
out.
2 31
Most significantly, the SEC's conclusions make no finding
with respect to materiality for purposes of Rule 14d-9(b)'s lan-
guage requiring disclosure of any material change in the infor-
mation. Apparently, the SEC assumed the materiality of the
information, concluding that the existence of negotiations was
a material change because Revlon had previously indicated
that no negotiations were underway. Interestingly, while
Revlon is one of two administrative proceedings-aside from
Kern-to consider Item 7,232 it appeared to conflict with a de-
tions" and "discussions" significant, see Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701 (Del.
1983). In describing the facts of the case, the Weinberger court noted that "[in the
original draft of the proxy statement the word 'negotiations' had been used rather
than 'discussions.' However, when the Securities and Exchange Commission sought
details of the 'negotiations' as part of its review of [those] materials, the term
(negotiations] was deleted and the word 'discussions' was substituted." Id. at 707.
No indication is given as to why the SEC insisted on this change.
"lBy that time, the parties had established contact, had begun and con-
cluded their initial reviews of confidential financial information, had re-
tained counsel to discuss between and among themselves the structure
and timing of the acquisitions, and had discussed the percentage of equi-
ty to be offered ... to the Revlon management group. Shaykin presented
an offer to Revlon, Lazard and Forstmann Little on September 29 which,
although rejected, became the basis on which the parties negotiated ....
Revlon, at 88,147.
'2 Only one other SEC enforcement proceeding, In re The Lionel Corporation,
Exchange Act Release No. 30,121, [1991-92 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 84,908 (Dec. 30, 1991), focused on the disclosure duty under Item 7 of
Schedule 14D-9. Lionel dealt with the target company's failure to disclose that it
had engaged in negotiations with the hostile bidder. Id. at 82,365-66. Citing
Revlon, the SEC concluded that certain telephone conversations between the bidder
and the target pertaining to the cessation of litigation between the two parties
and finding a third party to buy the bidder's shares in the target, constituted
"negotiations" within the meaning of Item 7(a). Id. The SEC also concluded that
Lionel violated Item 7(b) by failing to disclose a board resolution authorizing man-
agement to negotiate with the bidder to end the litigation, which would result in
the acquisition of securities required to be disclosed under Item 7(a)(3). Id. Once
again, in concluding that the commencement of these negotiations was a "material
change in the information," the SEC made no reference to materiality or to Basic.
In In re Heights Fin. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 20,354, 29 SEC Docket
(CCH) 106 (1983), the SEC noted that negotiations by Heights with a third party
for a right of first refusal to the exercise of warrants for its stock "are required to
be disclosed in filings on Schedule 14D-9 . . . if entered into in response to a
tender offer." Id. at 107 n.1. The SEC did not actually allege, though, that
Heights had violated Rule 14d-9.
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cision by the Sixth Circuit, which is the only appellate court to
analyze Item 7's disclosure requirements.' 3
Clearly, then, Mr. Kern's assertion that Allied's original
Other courts have dealt with Item 7, but have not resolved the central issue
crucial to the fundamental dispute in Kern: whether the negotiations required to
be disclosed under Item 7(a)(1) are material per se. In Southdown, Inc. v. Moore
McCormack Resources, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 595 (S.D. Tex. 1985), a district court
held that a target company's failure to detail fully a proposed recapitalization plan
"may not have amounted to a material misrepresentation designed to manipulate
the market" and thus, was insufficient to give rise to injunctive relief. Id. at 604-
05 (emphasis added).
In Starkman v. Marathon Oil, 772 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1015 (1986), former shareholders of Marathon sued the company under Rule
10b-5, claiming that Marathon's Schedule 14D-9, Item 7 disclosures were material-
ly false and misleading. In a Schedule 14D-9 filed in response to a hostile bid by
Mobil Oil, Marathon disclosed in Item 7 that its Board had considered "exploring
and investigating" certain responses to the tender offer, including "a business com-
bination between [Marathon] and another company." Id. at 236. However, at the
time of the Item 7 disclosure, Marathon had in fact contacted a number of compa-
nies concerning a possible merger and had commenced negotiations with U.S.
Steel. One week later, U.S. Steel announced that it had agreed to acquire Mara-
thon. Id. at 235-36.
The Sixth Circuit, relying on an erroneous perception of the SEC's policy with
respect to the disclosure of on-going negotiations during a tender offer, concluded
that Marathon was not liable because Marathon's Item 7 disclosure of the possibil-
ity of a merger was sufficient for Rule 10b-5 purposes:
The SEC and the courts have enunciated a firm rule regarding a tender
offer target's duty to disclose ongoing negotiations: so long as merger or
acquisition discussions are preliminary, general disclosure of the fact that
such alternatives are being considered will be sufficient to adequately
inform shareholders; a duty to disclose the possible terms of any transac-
tion and the parties thereto arises only after an agreement in principle,
regarding such fundamental terms as price and structure, has been
reached.
Id. at 243 (citation omitted). The Starkman court's holding was erroneous in two
respects. First, the Sixth Circuit completely misstated the SEC's policy concerning
disclosure of negotiations inasmuch as it declined to look to the releases proposing
and adopting Item 7. Second, the court improperly associated Rule 10b-5's materi-
ality-based disclosure with the Item 7's affirmative duty of disclosure. See Brown,
supra note 11, at 110 ("[Iln interpreting the provision, the court mischaracterized
the Commission's position. The Commission had never indicated that a list of
alternatives would suffice when actual negotiations were taking place."); Goelzer,
supra note 11, at 983 ("The difficulty with the Starkman opinion is that it confus-
es the limitation in item 7(a) on the disclosure of preliminary merger negotiations
with the obligation under Rule 10b-5 to refrain from making materially incomplete
or misleading statements."); Goldstein et al., supra note 11, at 144-45 ("The Sixth
Circuit's decision . . . highlights the current confusion with respect to disclosure of
preliminary merger negotiations .... [Sltarkman did not consider whether Mara-
thon violated Rule 14d-9. Starkman only held that Marathon had no affirmative




Item 7 disclosure was sufficient to inform shareholders of the
dealings between Allied and DeBartolo-an argument that
Judge Blair properly rejected-is untenable. "Exploration and
investigation," the words used to describe Alied's defensive
efforts,2 are tantamount to discussions that, as Revlon made
clear, need not be disclosed under Item 7. However, when
Allied and DeBartolo began to discuss the price and structure
of the putative deal, the discussions ripened into "negotia-
tions," regardless of the status of the financing commitments.
Accordingly, so long as the onset of those "negotiations" consti-
tuted a material change in the information for purposes of
Rule 14d-9(b), Mr. Kern was under a duty to amend Allied's
Schedule 14D-9.
2. The Negotiations in Kern Constituted a Per Se
Material Change in the Information Requiring
Amendment
The fundamental question raised by Kern is how to view
one's duty to amend Item 7 in light of Rule 14d-9(b)'s language
mandating that "material change[s]... in the information" 5
be disclosed. Does the word "material" in this context require
an assessment of the materiality of the negotiations? If so,
does Rule 12b-2, Northway or Basic's definition of materiality
control? These questions can be answered in three different
ways, none of which supports Mr. Kern's argument or Judge
Blair's legal analyses.
Both Mr. Kern and Judge Blair erroneously assumed, that
Rule 14d-9(b) requires an assessment of the materiality of the
information being considered for disclosure in an amend-
mentY6 As demonstrated above, however,27 because Item
7(a)(1) requires the disclosure of merger negotiations that are
per se material, the occurrence of negotiations required to be
disclosed under Item 7(a)(1) subsequent to the filing of the
2m See supra note 134.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9(b) (1993) (emphasis added).
' By arguing that Basic controlled, both Mr. Kern and Judge Blair assumed
that the word "material" in Rule 14d-9(b) permitted Mr. Kern to assess the signifi-
cance of the negotiations before deciding whether to amend Allied's Schedule 14D-
9.
2' See supra notes 193-204 and accompanying text.
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original Schedule 14D-9 constitutes a per se material change in
the information. The sudden occurrence of a material event is,
by definition, a material change.238
Moreover, even accepting that Rule 14d-9(b)'s "material
change" language permitted Judge Blair and Mr. Kern to as-
sess the materiality of the negotiations, they erroneously con-
cluded that Basic should provide the controlling guidelines. 9
In doing so, they failed to observe that Rule 12b-22 40 com-
mands filing parties to apply the equivalent of Northway's
materiality standard to the word "material" when it is used to
qualify the furnishing of information.24 Thus, both Mr. Kern
and Judge Blair should have applied Rule 12b-2 to the negotia-
tions at issue. Indeed, by applying Basic, Judge Blair made a
fundamental legal error. Basic was a Rule 10b-5 "duty not to
mislead" case in which liability could be established only if the
negotiations at issue were material. It is well settled, however,
that the duty to disclose information (or to refrain from mak-
ing misleading statements) under Rule 10b-5 is linked part
and parcel to the materiality question. But by applying Basic
in the Rule 14d-9 context, where the duty of disclosure is an
affirmative one, Judge Blair's ruling implies that Basic's adop-
tion of the case-by-case, probability/magnitude test for Rule
10b-5 cases somehow negated the SEC's categorical pronounce-
ments that Item 7 calls for information that is material per se.
This assumption is manifestly incorrect.242 As argued above,
' In other words, because Northway contemplates the disclosure of information
when there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consid-
er it important, the occurrence of an event that the SEC itself has deemed to be
material is, by logic, a per se material change in the information. Consequently,
Judge Blair's initial analysis should have focused on whether Item 7 calls for the
disclosure of information that is material per se.
2 * See supra notes 156 & 166 and accompanying text.
240 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (1993). For the full text of the SEC's materiality defi-
nition, see supra note 201.
241 Id.
2 A review of the briefs and memoranda submitted by the Division indicates
that it, too, had not considered whether Rule 12b-2 should control Judge Blair's
analysis. Indeed, while the Division made passing reference to Rule 12b-2 as the
"applicable test' for materiality, Memorandum of Law of the Division of Enforce-
ment, supra note 21, at 9, the primary support for its argument that the events
at issue were material was Basic. Id. at 30. In so doing, the Division actually
limited the controlling force of its rules and regulations; it permitted Judge Blair
to rule that Basic's case-by-case analysis, and not Rule 12b-2 (Northway), applied
to Rule 14d-9(b)'s "material change" language.
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the SEC not only has the authority to define the word "materi-
al" either more or less expansively than the Supreme Court's
definition,243 it also may categorize a whole class of informa-
tion (preliminary merger negotiations conducted in response to
a tender offer) as material and require its disclosure.2' Be-
cause the SEC had already concluded that Item 7 negotiations
are per se material, they constituted a "material change in the
information" as a matter of law for Rule 14d-9(b) purposes.
Finally, the most simplistic way of analyzing whether
information constitutes a "material change in the information"
requiring amendment is to focus simply on the duty to disclose
created by the line-item, without regard to materiality. Where
line-item provisions such as Item 7(a)(1) do not premise disclo-
sure on materiality, the occurrence of an event specifically
required to be disclosed should likewise be deemed a per se
material change in the information, regardless of whether the
information itself is material under Northway or Basic.24 Ap-
Similarly, the Division's strongest argument-that the Commission had al-
ready determined that the negotiations required to be disclosed under Item 7 were
per se material-was not advanced with any degree of conviction. Indeed, the
Division's assertion that "[the Commission's announcement that [Item 7 informa-
tion is] material ... is sufficient by itself to establish ... materiality," Id. at 26
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted), was advanced in the "Legislative
History" section of its Memorandum of Law, and not in the "Argument" section.
This litigation strategy is questionable: the Division was willing to forego its stron-
gest Administrative Law argument and permit Judge Blair to diminish the SEC's
authority by applying Basic in order to prevail on the merits. While it is undis-
puted that Judge Blair ultimately found that the undisclosed events were material
under Basic, the SEC may have "won the battle but lost the war." By not pushing
the "per se materiality" argument to its logical extreme, the Division has risked
that, like Mr. Kern, others will refrain from disclosing negotiations which they
subjectively believe to be immaterial even though the Commission has stated very
clearly that such negotiations are always material; that is precisely what Judge
Blair's ruling permits.
23 See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
2" See id.
24 This is by no means a concession that Item 7(a) might require disclosure of
non-material information (although the SEC has the authority to do so). On the
contrary, Item 7 in one clear example of a line-item provision that calls for the
disclosue of information that is per se material. See supra notes 193-204 and ac-
companying text. But there are line-items that do require disclosure of non-mate-
rial information. In those instances, when deciding whether information required to
be disclosed initially under such a line-item provision constitutes a "material
change in the information," practitioners should not be permitted to withhold what
they believe is immaterial information. Events normally required to be disclosed
(regardless of their materiality) in an initial Schedule must logically be disclosed
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plied to Kern, the occurrence of negotiations, which Mr. Kern
contended were not material under Basic, but which were
specifically required to be disclosed under Item 7(a)(1), consti-
tuted a per se material change in the information.246 This
method of analysis would effectively prevent those who com-
plain that some line-item provisions require disclosure of oth-
erwise immaterial information from arguing, as did Mr. Kern,
that such information cannot constitute a material change
simply because the information itself is not material.24 7
Additionally, the concerns voiced by Mr. Kern and many
other securities practitioners that premature disclosure of
negotiations (i.e., disclosure of immaterial negotiations) would
do more harm than good"8 are inapposite because those con-
in an amendment if those events occur after the initial Schedule has been filed.
' The difference between this method of analysis and the first method-that
the negotiations are per se material-is subtle. The following illustration may be
helpful. The examples assume that the line-item provision in question, like Item
7(a)(1), does not predicate disclosure on materiality. Under the first method of
analysis, the argument would proceed as follows: negotiations concerning a white
knight merger have just commenced; Item 7(a)(1) requires disclosure of negotia-
tions leading to a white knight merger; we did not disclose negotiations in our
original Schedule 14D-9 because none were underway; because the Commission has
concluded that Item 7 negotiations are always material, the negotiations must be
material; therefore, the negotiations must constitute a per se material change in
the information requiring amendment. Under the second method of analysis (Item
7 information might not be material), the argument would proceed as follows:
negotiations concerning a white knight merger have just commenced; Item 7(aX1)
requires disclosure of white knight negotiations; we did not disclose the negoti-
ations in our original Schedule 14D-9 because no negotiations were yet underway;
because the negotiations only recently commenced, they may or may not be mate-
rial under Rule 12b-2 (or Basic); nevertheless, because Item 7 requires their disclo-
sure, the existence of even immaterial negotiations where no negotiations existed
before constitutes a per se material change in the information requiring prompt
amendment.
" If a line-item provision does indeed call for the disclosure of otherwise im-
material information that is harmful to investors, the proper course of action is to
petition for a change of the rules-not the withholding of information that the
SEC has specifically required be disclosed. See infra note 257-61 and accompanying
text.
24 Premature disclosure of preliminary negotiations may tend to mislead the
market and jeopardize potential deals. Commentators have noted that during a
tender offer a target company's share price becomes extremely volatile, reacting to
even the slightest piece of information. Hazen, supra note 10, at 956. Thus, they
conclude, premature disclosure of negotiations may lead investors to believe that a
deal is imminent, causing them to purchase the target company's shares. This, in
turn, pushes the price of the shares up and may make the putative deal prohibi-
tively expensive for the potential acquiror. Id.; Brown, supra note 11, at 145;
Koenig, supra note 29, at 1023. Furthermore, many potential acquirors insist on
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cerns--concerns that ultimately caused the Basic court to
adopt the Second Circuit's probability/magnitude test-were
addressed in the Instruction to Item 7(a):
If no agreement in principle has yet been reached, the possible
terms of any transaction or the parties thereto need not be disclosed
if in the opinion of the Board of Directors of the subject company
such disclosure would jeopardize continuation of such negotiations.
In such event, disclosure that negotiations are being undertaken or
are underway and are in the preliminary stages will be suffi-
cient."9
Perhaps the most significant aspect of this instruction is that
in response to arguments that the premature disclosure of
negotiations would be harmful, the SEC merely limited the
breadth of the required disclosure. It did not, however, concede
that negotiations that were in their formative stages were
immaterial. On the contrary, the SEC believed that the mere
fact that negotiations were occurring was sufficient reason to
require their disclosure. By permitting target companies to
withhold the terms of and parties to the negotiations, the SEC
resolved the policy concerns addressed in and ultimately re-
solved by BasicY
While Mr. Kern should have known that disclosure under
Item 7(a) is not premised on materiality, Rule 14d-9(b)'s use of
the word "material" is sufficiently confusing so as to place
some blame with the SEC. Indeed, the SEC itself is guilty of
negotiating in secrecy; premature disclosure therefore could potentially interfere
with the progress of acquisition negotiations. Hazen, supra note 10, at 954;
Steinberg & Goldman, supra note 53, at 926-27; Goelzer, supra note 11, at 992.
2 Schedule 14D-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (Item 7) (1993). When Item 7 was
originally proposed, it required disclosure of "any negotiation or transaction being
undertaken" in relation to significant corporate events. Proposed Rules, supra note
198, at 81,235 (emphasis added). However, the SEC acknowledged that the pro-
posed Rule might lead to the harm that caused several Courts of Appeal to adopt
a bright-line rule for materiality:
The proposal was criticized by commentators who were concerned that
[Item 7] would elicit premature disclosure of negotiations with competing
bidders which could dissuade them from making an offer .... The Com-
mission recognizes that premature disclosure of matters contemplated by
the proposal may be detrimental to the interests of security holders. The
effective representation of the interests of security holders may at times
require management to maintain confidentiality during the formative
stages of negotiations.
Tender Offers, Exchange Act Release No. 16,384, supra note 199, at 82,594.
' See Brown, supra note 11, at 106-07.
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imposing a materiality requirement in the amendment context
where none is required for initial disclosure. Thus, even the
SEC has managed to second-guess its own requirements. In In
re Merry Land & Investment Co." 1 the SEC found that the
respondent had violated Schedule 13D, Items 4(b) and 4(d),
which do not predicate disclosure on materiality,252 and Rule
13d-2(a) by failing to disclose a material change in its control
intent:
Contrary to the stated purpose publicly disclosed in its Schedule
13D, Knox's statements at the September 21, 1987 meeting with
Osteen reflect that, at least by that date, [Merry Land] had formed
an intent to initiate or support hostile activities against [the
issuer's] management. The Commission concludes that the events of
September 21, 1987 were of such a nature as to have "significantly
altered the total mix of information made available" regarding [Mer-
ry Land's] intent not to initiate or support activities against the
wishes of the [issuer's] management, and thus, "would have been
considered to be important by a reasonable shareholder."'
If the SEC had followed in Merry Land the method of analysis
proposed in this Comment, its decision would have reasoned
that, since control intent is material information, any change
therein is a per se material change in the information requir-
ing amendment. The SEC's analysis in Merry Land suffers
from the same deficiency as Mr. Kern and Judge Blair's analy-
sis in Kern: they both do a disservice to the SEC line-item
provisions by second-guessing the importance of the informa-
tion required to be disclosed thereunder. However, because of
the obvious confusion caused by Rule 14d-9(b)'s "materiality"
requirement, whether Mr. Kern negligently. 4 caused Allied's
failure to comply with Item 7 is questionable. 5 It may be
unfair to hold that Mr. Kern knew or should have known that,
in analyzing the materiality of the negotiations at issue in
Kern under Basic or Northway, he would be causing Allied to
violate securities laws, especially when the Commission itself
"' Exchange Act Release No. 26,410, 1988 SEC Lexis 2606 slip op. (Dec. 30,
1988).
22 See supra note 186.
Merry Land, slip op. at *15-16 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426
U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). The court also cited to Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224
(1988).
See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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has employed the same erroneous analysis.Y
C. A Proposal For Modifying Rule 14d-9(b)
As previously discussed, Mr. Kern's principal reason for
not amending Allied's Schedule 14D-9 to reflect the negotia-
tions that had occurred between Allied and DeBartolo was that
those negotiations were not "material" under the standard
enunciated by the Supreme Court in BasicY7 But nowhere
does Schedule 14D-9, Item 7(a)(1) predicate disclosure on the
materiality of the negotiations described therein. Therefore,
Mr. Kern essentially usurped Rule 14d-9(b)'s "material change"
language, which he assumed permitted him to perform a mate-
riality analysis of the negotiations under Basic, by withholding
what he believed to be immaterial information."5 This Com-
ment has suggested, however, that even non-material negotia-
tions occurring after the target company has filed its Schedule
14D-9 also constitute a material change in the information for
Rule 14d-9(b) purposes. 9
Therefore, to avoid the sort of dispute that arose in Kern,
Rule 14d-9(b) should be modified by adding an instruction. The
instruction should emphasize that, for line-item provisions that
do not predicate disclosure on materiality, any event specifical-
ly required to be disclosed in the original Schedule, but which
occurs subsequent to its filing, constitutes a per se material
change in the information, which must be disclosed in an
amendment regardless of whether or not the event or informa-
tion is material.26 Such an instruction would ensure that
See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
2" See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
' This Comment has argued vehemently that all negotiations required to be
disclosed under Item 7(a)(1) of Schedule 14D-9 are implicitly material under the
Basic standard. By logic, therefore, the occurrence of a material event must nec-
essarily constitute a per se material change in the information.
2" See supra notes 185 & 245 and accompanying text.
' This instruction should be added to all rules requiring amendment of SEC
Schedules promulgated under the Williams Act because those rules contain the
same wording as Rule 14d-9(b). See, e.g., Rule 13d-2(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2(a)
(1993) (requiring amendment of Schedule 13D to reflect any material change in
the information); Rule 13e-3(e)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(e)(2) (1993) (requiring
amendment of Schedule 13E-3 to reflect any material change in the information);
Rule 14d-6(d), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-6(d) (1993) (requiring amendment of Schedule
14D-1 to reflect any material change in the information).
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non-material information which is required to be disclosed in
the original Schedule 14D-9 would also have to be disclosed in
an amendment to the Schedule; it prevents filing parties such
as Mr. Kern from injecting a materiality standard into a line-
item provision where none actually exists."
CONCLUSION
This Comment has argued that preliminary merger negoti-
ations required to be disclosed under Item 7(a)(1) of Schedule
14D-9 are material per se. That argument is amply supported
by the SEC's releases proposing and adopting Item 7, and
simply by acknowledging on a common-sense level the signifi-
cance of such information to a reasonable shareholder. Accord-
ingly, no filing entity should be permitted to use Rule 14d-
9(b)'s "material change" language to assess, under Basic, the
materiality of negotiations that occur subsequent to the filing
of the company's original Schedule 14D-9. The existence of
negotiations that are material per se must necessarily consti-
tute a per se "material change in the information" for purposes
of Rule 14d-9(b).
Clearly, then, the ALJ in Kern erroneously relied on Basic
in assessing the materiality of the information that Mr. Kern
had subjectively decided to withhold. Moreover, because the
Commission let stand this erroneous legal conclusion, it re-
mains binding precedent on the securities bar. This Comment
urges the Commission to clarify its amendment rules to reflect
that its "material change" language does not impose on other-
wise mandatory disclosure requirements-requirements that
do not predicate disclosure upon materiality-a materiality
' This solution would not render the word "material" in Rule 14d-9(b) mean-
ingless. On the contrary, where a line-item specifically predicates disclosure on
materiality, an issuer would have to assess the materiality of any information that
might be required to be disclosed thereunder. Thus, where negotiations were tak-
ing place when the original Schedule 14D-9 was filed that did not pertain to a
"material amount of assets" (see Schedule 14D-9, Item 7(aX3)), but subsequently
negotiations are focused on the sale of over half of the company's assets, a materi-
al change has occurred under Rule 14d-9(b), triggering the duty to amend. Similar-
ly, Rule 14d-9(b)'s "material change" language is important for analyzing whether
subtle changes in the information previously disclosed-as opposed to the sudden




threshold. The amendment requirements should emphasize
that where a filing entity has no discretion to withhold infor-
mation as immaterial in its original schedule, it may not do so
when deciding whether to amend; if the information is re-
quired under the line-item provision it must be disclosed irre-
spective of its materiality.
Finally, the Kern case also raises a more fundamental
question as to the weight to be accorded to the SEC's judgment
and expertise. As the agency charged with promulgating dis-
closure requirements, the SEC is entitled to state that a partic-
ular line-item provision calls for the disclosure of material
information. When it does so, neither filing entities nor courts
should be permitted to second-guess the SEC by assessing
independently the materiality of information that the SEC
itself believes to be material. This sort of second-guessing un-
dermines the SEC's primary goal of investor protection and
diminishes its unquestionably broad authority to define certain
classes of information as per se material.
Steven G. Sanders*
This Comment is dedicated to my mother, Ingrid V. Sanders, who died on
January 16, 1993. I am grateful to Professor Norman S. Poser and to Professor
(and former SEC Commissioner) Roberta S. Karmel for constructively criticizing
earlier drafts.
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